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PANEL V: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY ON
THE INTERNET
SHORTNESS OF VISION: REGULATORY
AMBITION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Susan P. Crawford*
INTRODUCTION

Quietly, in impenetrable regulatory language and carefully staged steps,
some of the governments of the world have undertaken to constrain the
open platforms and open devices that make up the network of networks that
is the Internet. The Internet has matured and become vital to commercial1
life, they say, and surely it is time for someone to be in charge.
Meanwhile, public concern about the perceived dangers of online life is
increasing. There is spam. There is spyware. There is pornography, and
we will soon see more convulsive efforts to "protect" Internet users from its
effects. Pummelled with news stories about the cesspools of online life,
citizens who are not online may become less inclined to go there, and many
of those who are merely sending email certainly wish that someone would
make the spam go away. Meanwhile, the content industry and law
enforcement authorities are both interested in constraining the free flows of
information that have characterized the Internet so far. The convergence of
regulatory ambition and public concern is unmistakable. It could well lead
to actions that we will regret, as regulatory agencies take the occasion of
* Assistant Professor, Cardozo School of Law. Many thanks to Yochai Benkler, Michael
Herz, David Johnson, Pam Samuelson, Kevin Stack, Stewart Sterk, and Tim Wu. An earlier
version of this paper was discussed during the 2004 cyberprof retreat hosted by the Berkman
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Brianne Biggiani,
Joshua Goldstein, and Anthony diFrancesca, who provided research assistance.
1. Interview with Markus Kummer, Head Secretariat of the United Nations Working
Group
on
Internet
Governance,
Int'l
Telecomm.
Union,
http://www.circleid.com/posts/interview with united nations-head-secretariatofwgig/
(last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
It is a positive sign that countries are discussing how to run the Internet, since it
requires global solutions to its problems.... Governments now feel that the
Internet has become so important that it should be regarded as a matter of national
interest. And so they see the need for getting involved.... The governments who
want to play a more active role also see a need for closer international cooperation.
They feel that the United Nations is the natural system of global governance and
they hold the view that a United Nations umbrella would be a prerequisite to give
the necessary political legitimacy to Internet governance.
Id.
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public fear to assert greater-but ultimately counterproductive--control
over online applications and devices.
This global regulatory trend is sometimes referred to as the process of
"Internet governance." My goal in this Article is to persuade you that we
face a great choice in the current Internet governance debate between open
platforms, open devices, and diversity, on the one hand, and constrained
platforms, constrained devices, and monocultures, on the other. This is an
important choice because of its implications for the value, richness, and
vibrancy of all human communications.
We should not take the
evolutionary risky choice of imposing centrally controlled boundaries (or
membranes) regulating flows of bits 2-information-online.
Moreover, if
the proponents of centralized control are allowed to proceed, they will
waste an enormous amount of energy working towards failure. While they
may initially be emboldened to claim victory when their large-scale moves
change the online landscape, over time the complexity of the Internet's
information flows will defeat the forces of centralization. In the meantime,
major opportunities for innovation, decentralized "regulation," and creative
social and economic engagement will have been foreclosed.
Part I provides an analytical framework for the upcoming national
conversation about governance of online information flows. The Internet is
itself a complex adaptive system, made up of many interacting agents
(including many non-state communities) whose dynamic engagements
produce elaborate, decentralized, permeable membranes regulating
information flow. 3 Think of the Internet as an environment in which
government is attempting to operate, like the terrain on which a battle is
played out. Where the complexity of a system (government) is insufficient
to cope with the complexity of its environment (the Internet), the system
will be unsuccessful.
Although large-scale operations can defeat
complexity when the large-scale system is able to operate (in the same way
that a platoon of tanks can roll over a forest), if the large-scale system is
2. By "bits," I mean machine-readable representations of information. "Bit" is
shorthand for "binary digit," the smallest unit of information on a machine. A single bit can
exemplify only one of two values: 0 or 1. More significant information is obtained by
combining consecutive bits into larger units-such as bytes, which are made up of eight
consecutive bits. Netdictionary, http://www.netdictionary.com/b.html (last visited Oct. 23,

2005).
3. Other examples of complex systems are "[t]he economy, the stock market, the
weather, ant colonies, earthquakes, traffic jams, living organisms, ecosystems, turbulence,
epidemics, the immune system, river networks, land-slides, zebra stripes, sea-shell patterns,
and heartbeats." Ben Moore, Inst. for Theoretical Physics, Univ. of Zurich, Complex
Systems, http://krone.physik.unizh.ch/-moore/complex/complexity.html (last visited Oct.
23, 2005) (defining complexity). Interactions among the agents that make up a complex
system lead to emergent properties of the system (properties that could not be explained by
traditional analysis) that are not properties of the agents themselves. Complex networks
have self-similar (fractal) properties, meaning that they consist of self-repeating patterns at
all scales. Erica Klarreich, Sizing Up Complex Webs: Close or Far,Many Networks Look
the
Same,
Science
News
Online,
Jan.
29,
2005,
http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/20050129/fob3.asp (reporting results from Chaoming
Song et al., Self-Similarity of Complex Networks, 433 Nature 392 (2005)).
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concerned about the fate of the complex structures it seeks to flatten, it will
be unable to engage. There are many positive benefits of the Internet's
complex information flows that governments will want to retain. Grappling
with this complexity will ultimately make it impossible for governments to
"govern the net."
Part II provides the domestic legal background for this battle. To date,
the U.S. Congress has acted with great self-restraint in "regulating the
Internet," with some exceptions. It has shielded platform providers from
liability for the information flows they do not create, and has adopted
relatively lightweight "notice and takedown" regimes for copyrighted
materials inadvertently hosted or stored by platforms. It has refused to
engage in special taxation systems for online commerce, and has (so far)
not adopted special Internet data privacy laws. More recently, its obsession
with sinful activities has led it to take aggressive (and aberrational)
approaches to Internet gambling and "harmful to minors" online content.
These incongruous steps have gotten Congress in trouble both globally and
in the U.S. courts. In 2005, congressional self-restraint is under pressure,
and this Article is an attempt to remind Congress of the correctness of its
initial approach-and to strengthen congressional will to fend off the
strident demands of law enforcement and the content industry for Internet
regulation.
Two U.S. domestic case studies, both having to do with the powers of the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission"),
demonstrate that agency's tendency to assume that a top-down engineering
The first, the broadcast flag
approach can "fix" online problems.
rulemaking, focused on the interfaces between machines that manipulate
digital content and the Internet. 4 The second, the IP-enabled services
rulemaking, 5 concerns applications and services that use the Internet
Protocol ("IP"). 6 These two fascinating proceedings have largely gone
unnoticed by the mainstream press, but are enormously important to the
future of the Internet. They represent the first organized effort to "regulate
the Internet" by creating centrally planned barriers to particular kinds of
bits. Both of these proceedings have as their key goal the creation of
mandated membranes (or boundaries) for information flows, by affecting
what machines can send out online and what online applications can work
on or provide. These proceedings ignore the possibility of any non-state
sources of membranes-much less the idea that such membranes could
evolve to shelter complex organisms of social order. They also conflict
with the FCC's overall deregulationist approach to online issues and are
4. Digital Broad. Content Prot, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (FCC report, order, and
further notice of proposed rule).
5. IP-Enabled Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (2004) (FCC notice of proposed
rulemaking).
6. The Internet Protocol ("IP") is "[t]he protocol used to route a data packet from its
Glossary,
Red
Hat
Internet."
via
the
destination
to
its
source
http://www.redhat.com/docs/glossary/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
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likely outside the scope of the FCC's delegated powers. Thus, we will
inevitably end up discussing these matters on Capitol Hill.
Part III tells the technical and political stories of these two rulemakings,
and ties these proceedings to other world events that fall within the larger
Internet governance category.
Part IV analyzes the legal tools that are available to understand and
address this moment in the Internet's history, including available domestic
constraints on the FCC's power. Congress has not given the FCC explicit
statutory authority to act in either the broadcast flag or IP-enabled services
situations. The FCC is relying on common-law "ancillary" jurisdiction,
stemming from Title I of the Telecommunications Act, 7 as the source of its
powers. In making rules that are legally binding on the public, however, an
agency must be able to draw a line from its powers to some provision of
enacted law. 8 No provision of existing law expressly supports (or even
signals support for) the FCC's actions here, and Congress would not have
delegated such economically important powers lightly. 9 Moreover, existing
case law establishes that the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction is limited to acts
that are necessary to ensure the achievement of the FCC's statutory
responsibilities. Because there has been no showing in either of these
settings that such necessity exists, it is likely that a court would find that the
FCC does not have jurisdiction to impose the "social policy" rules
stemming from the IP Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-just as a court has
already found that the FCC did not have jurisdiction to impose the
broadcast flag rule. Thus, we will need a national legislative conversation
about the approach to the Internet embodied in these two rulemakings.
Part V then suggests an alternative outlet for governments' desires to
constrain information flows. Governments will not be content with simply
leaving information flows alone. Once we understand the importance of
membranes and the impossibility of designing them in advance,
governments' direction should be clear: They should act to encourage the
evolution of decentralized feedback loops and membranes that can better do
the job. Decentralization of choices about what is "good" (and, thus, what
membranes for information flows are best) will lead, over time, to
emergence of a clear path towards governance: evolution of complex
organisms that will provide a constantly evolving, lively, and dynamic
social order.
Who should be in charge online has become an extremely important
cultural, social, and intellectual question. At this turning point in the
7. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5c and in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
8. Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2100-01 (2004) (discussing the importance

of exclusive delegation understanding rather than nondelegation; agencies and courts have
no inherent authority to make law (at least with respect to the matters covered by Article I),
but Congress may transfer such authority to them) ("Article I, Section 1 tells us not that only
Congress can legislate, but only Congress can delegate.").
9. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
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development of the Internet, the need for longer-term and humbler
collective vision is acute. We need to recognize that Internet governance is
really about regulating information flows, that all we can hope to do
globally is to encourage adequate evolution, and that finding someone to be
the external pilot is both an impossible and dangerous task. In the absence
of the long view, the world will suffer from the regulatory ambitions of
central planners whose efforts are doomed to fail. We may never know
what we have lost. The U.S. Congress should be encouraged to lead the
world towards self-restraint, both because it is the right thing to do and
because this approach will avoid expensively unsuccessful attempts to do
otherwise.
I. PRINCIPLES OF NONREGULATION FOR THE INTERNET

Before taking on the question of membranes for information flows
online, it is appropriate to review how the Internet differs from any other
communications medium society has used to date. This will help ground
the discussion of membranes and complex systems that follows.
The story of the Internet-and its exceptionalism-has often been told.' 0
I set forth here only the briefest of summaries.
A. What Is the Internet?
The Internet is not a thing. It is an agreement to allow bits to flow among
machines using a particular language, or protocol." It is often thought of in
terms of its layers-from bottom to top: (1) physical/infrastructure layer
(cable, satellite, DSL, WiFi), (2) logical layer (TCP/IP, HTTP), (3)
applications layer (browsers, email, Voice over IP ("VolP")), and (4)
content layer (speech, text, music). 12 The third and fourth layers are really
not global layers at all. Instead, they are layers deployed by individuals and
enterprises to make use of the lower layers. The first two layers separate
transport (sending bits down a connection) from the protocol, such as
TCP/IP, that chunks these bits into packets and allows them to be
13
reassembled at the other end.
10. For fine examples of writing about the architecture of the Internet and its interplay
with law, see Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet
Architecture and the Law, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 815 (2004); A. Michael Froomkin,
Habernas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 Harv. L. Rev.
749 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the BroadbandEra, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925 (2001).
11. William Gibson describes cyberspace as an immersive "consensual hallucination."
William Gibson, Neuromancer 5 (1984).
12. Arguably, yet another layer is now evolving that facilitates the formation of complex
social groups based on exchanges of bits and effective use of the metainformation that is
generated by these exchanges. The emergence of this new "social protocol" layer of the
Internet suggests that we will collectively build a better society, not just a better Internet, if
we build systems and laws that let that society evolve online. That layer is the subject for
another article.
13. See
Webopedia
Definition
of
TCP/IP,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/TCP.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
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The layers nondiscrimination principle dictates that all forms of the
physical/infrastructure layer can or will permit the logical layer to run
across them. Thus, fiber-optic infrastructure or wireless connections will
permit TCP/IP to work. In turn, the logical layer, which contains the
protocols that divide up packets and reconstruct them into messages or web
pages, is not (in principle) supposed to discriminate against particular
applications that use that logical layer. And applications are not (in
14
principle) supposed to discriminate against particular forms of content.
Implementation of the layers principle (e.g., not allowing the transport
layer to discriminate against any of the three levels above) permits the endto-end principle first articulated in an important paper by Jerome Saltzer,
David Reed, and David Clark in 1984 to flourish. 15 The end-to-end
principle suggests that communications-information-ideally should not
be filtered or changed or operated on by the network itself, but only by the
edges, at the level of client applications that individuals set up and
manipulate. 16 This end-to-end principle, like the layers principle, keeps bits
flowing freely across the lower levels of the protocol stack, to be processed
only when they get much closer to the end user-the edge of the network. 17
The miraculous growth of the Internet has in large part come from the
nondiscrimination against higher levels that is part of the lower layers'
architecture. 18 Innovators at the application layer have been able to assume
14. The layers concept has recently become a suggested model for regulatory
intervention. In early 2004, MCI issued a paper suggesting that cable and telephone
providers be required to make their networks available to others on a wholesale basis, citing
(and relying on) the layers principle. Richard S. Whitt, Codifying the Network Layers
Model: MCI's Proposal for New Federal Legislation Reforming U.S. Communications Law
(2004) (MCI Public Policy Paper).
15. Jerome H. Saltzer, David P. Reed & David D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in
System Design, 2 ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 277 (1984).
16. See also David Isenberg, Rise of the Stupid Network, Computer Telephony, Aug.
1997, availableat http://www.rageboy.com/stupidnet.html.
17. The openness of the Internet (rough nondiscrimination between layers, intelligence
at the edges) stands in contrast to telephone networks, which use circuit switching. When a
telephone call is made from one person to another, a dedicated connection is opened and
sustained for the duration of the call. Because that connection goes in both directions, it is
called a circuit. A call is routed via a local carrier through a switch to reach the person you
are calling. Use of circuit switching therefore relies on intelligence-routing and processing
decisions being made-residing at the center of the network. Indeed, a fundamental goal of
telephony switches is to maintain control over circuits. See Susan P. Crawford, Someone to
Watch over Me: Social Policies for the Internet (unpublished manuscript on file with author)
(describing history of telephony). Data networks such as the Internet use packet-switching
rather than circuit switching. There is no constant, open connection in a packet switched
network.
Instead, the sending computer divides data into packets, puts addressing
information on each one, and opens a connection just long enough to send each packet one
hop. The packets follow whatever route seems most efficient at the time (which may be
different for each packet) and are reassembled by the receiving computer. Where a central
telephone provider must provide enhanced functionalities at a physical termination point, IP
network design is flat and highly decentralized, allowing substantial innovation to occur at
the edges of the network. Id.
18. See Isenberg, supra note 16; see also ISOC: The Internet Society and Public Policy,
http://www.isoc.org/news/3.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2005) ("The explosive growth of the
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the continued stable existence of the lower layers, and have not had to
provide for either
transport or logical protocols in order to spread their
19
applications.
B. Why Are Membranes Important to the Internet?
The open standards and nondiscriminatory layers of the Internet have
prompted much more than mere innovation. The Internet has given rise to
an explosive growth in information flows, prompting the emergence of a
richly varied, closely connected, and highly structured social, cultural, and
20
intellectual online world. More than 900 million people are now online.
The world has become much smaller as a result of the Internet's growth; it
is clear, for example, that the December 2004 tsunami relief response was
spurred by Internet communications. 2 1 Blogs have replaced mainstream
media as sources of news for many people. 22 Podcasting may replace
radio. 23 These flows are not just one-to-many, however. Increasingly, we
are seeing the emergence of a social layer of the protocol stack that involves
group interactions of all kinds: one-many-few to one-many-few. 2 4 What
makes this online structuring possible is the existence of membranes.
What is a "membrane"? For biological cells, of course, the membranes
that surround them are vital. They define the cell and determine what it can
and cannot do. Membranes were the first structures of living organisms to

Internet and the incredible variety of Internet applications are a direct result of the fact that
the key standards for the Internet and the Web are open.").
19. See ISOC: The Internet Society and Public Policy, supra note 18.
20. ClickZ Stats Web Worldwide, Trends & Statistics: The Web's Richest Source,
http://www.clickz.com/stats/webworldwide/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
21. As David Ho reported,
Rapidly changing estimates on the amount raised for victims of the Southeast
Asian earthquake and tsunami vary greatly, but there is consensus that at least half
of the hundreds of millions in private donations arrived through the Internet. The
American Red Cross has raised more than $168 million with more than $71
million coming through its Web site, according to The Chronicle of Philanthropy.
Of the $35 million received by the U.S. Fund for UNICEF in New York, $25
million is in Internet donations.
David Ho, Record Online Tsunami Relief Changes Ways of Giving, The Fin. Express, Jan.
17, 2005, http://www.financialexpress.com/fefull-story.php?contentid=79947?headline=
Record-online-tsunami-relief-changesways-of-giving.
22. Lee Rainie, Pew Internet & American Life Project, The State of Blogging (2005),
http://www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/PIP-bloggingdata.pdf (finding that blog readership was
up fifty-eight percent in 2004, that six million Americans get news and information fed to
them through Rich Site Summary ("RSS") aggregators, but that sixty-two percent of
Americans were unsure, however, of what a "blog" was).
23. Daniel Terdiman, Podcasts: New Twists on Net Audio, Wired News, Oct. 8, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,65237,00.html.
24. Beth Simone Noveck, A Democracy of Groups 3-4 (2005) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author) ("[T]echnology is revolutionizing our capacity for purposive
collective action with geographically remote actors.... This evolution toward technology
for groups is evident from Meetups, Wikis, LiveJournal, peer-to-peer, groupware, virtual
worlds, GRID computing, [and] a wide range of so-called "social software" tools, such as
Friendster or Wallop.").
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evolve,2 5 and their basic function is to separate the inside from outside-to
separate the chemicals and structures needed to maintain the cell from the
outside environment. Membranes regulate in both directions, filtering what
comes in and what goes out. The properties of cell membranes arise from
the physical behavior of various lipids (water-insoluble substances).
Bacteria can be destroyed by antibiotics punching holes in their cell
membranes, making them porous and leaky. 26 All membranes are
permeable, but you can have too much of a good thing. Some membranes
also have a homeostatic function in that they protect what is inside from
rapid change; not from all change, which would be deadly, but from too
27
much change too quickly.
There have always been membranes for information flows, and we have
always created them in decentralized ways. Every time an individual or a
group decides not to listen to some outside source of information, allows a
new member in, or reads something suggested by a colleague, he/it is using
(and participating in constructing) a permeable membrane. For cells and
other living things, permeable membranes are nutrient collection and dropoff areas; for minds, permeable membranes are information collection and
rejection areas that help us select the right data from the constant and
overwhelming flows surrounding us.
Informational membranes are
everywhere, and no one has to tell us how to create them or what their
characteristics are. There is no one "in charge" of this structure.
How do permeable informational membranes operate online? The
swapping of information is a simple interaction, but it requires copying onto
some substrate or surface in order for the information to continue to exist
and replicate and (eventually) evolve. For a bit, the best way to travel is to
be replicated or to be sent, as a copy, somewhere. So membranes for bits
are predominately established by the availability of mechanisms that allow
or frustrate the ability to make or send copies. Many online membranes are
very simple: who is allowed to be a member of a particular listserv, how do
you leave a particular provider of online services, what content is
appropriate for what online site, what community of blogs links to one
another, and more. Increasingly, online information is subject to the
membrane of attention. Some people (or some groups) pay attention to a
particular kind of information flow (and in so doing are directing whatever
membrane they have adopted to take in-be permeable to-this
information). We are remarkably selective about what we will take on
board and what we will not.
The growth of the Internet, through the networked, interactive screens
that make it human-readable, has facilitated a wild proliferation of
25. McGraw-Hill Online Learning Center, The Importance of Membranes,
http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0073031216/student view0/exercise9/the_
importance of membranes.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
26. Lukas Buehler, What Is Life, http://www.whatislife.com/education/fact/history.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
27. See
Definition
of
Homeostasis,
WordReference.com
Dictionary,
http://www.wordreference.com/definition/homeostasis (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
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interestingly permeable membranes. These membranes, in turn, have
facilitated a wild proliferation of varied information flows. The conceptual
and code-based rules that surround these communities act as two-way
membranes, permitting and prohibiting the flow of bits. These membranes
are legal code in the Lawrence Lessig sense, 28 but to describe them as
"law" would miss most of their important features. They are also the means
by which individuals and groups govern dialogue, communication, flux,
and flow. What we pay attention to defines who we are.
Government has not previously attempted to regulate who we are by way
of mandated information flow membranes, or at least not successfully.
Governments make disclosure rules that require the display of information,
like nutritional labeling, credit disclosures, and product safety statements.
But these are very different from mandated creation of membranes (e.g.,
"this kind of information may not pass through this kind of barrier.") We
have rarely allowed governments to establish or control informational
membranes. 29 Nor have we ever had to be explicit about the source of
informational membranes, because it was self-evident that offline
information flows were matters of nongovernmental decision. Membranes
are fundamental, emergent entities, existing only as a property of the
collective organism that created them. Centralized attempts to change or
ban particular informational membranes, such as mandating the use of
official languages, 30 or requiring that particular words not be used, 3 1 feel to
28. See generally, Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999).
29. Obscenity and child pornography, of course, are exceptions to this rule. But child
pornography laws are arguably focused on avoiding abuse of children rather than prohibiting
communication of information that appears to depict children engaged in sexual activitiesbehavior, rather than communication, is the true target of these laws. See Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (holding unconstitutional a ban on virtual child
pornography). Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") rules regulating "indecent"
and "profane" broadcast content (by limiting such content to broadcast between 10:00 pm
and 6:00 am), 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2004); see 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000), seem increasingly
anachronistic. As Professor Michael Dorf of Columbia said not long ago, "Was the [Janet
Jackson] halftime show unsuitable for the millions of small children watching? Sure. But so
are half the shows on prime-time television." Michael Dorf, Does the First Amendment
Protect Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake, CNN.com, Feb. 4, 2004,
Nearly
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/04/findlaw.analysis.dorf.jackson.indecency/.
100 percent of the indecency complaints sent to the FCC in 2003 stemmed from a single
advocacy group--the Parents Television Group. Todd Shields, Activists Dominate Content
2004,
6,
Dec.
MediaWeek.com,
Complaints,
http://www.mediaweek.com/mediaweek/headlines/articledisplay.jsp?vnucontent id=1000
731656. In Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Supreme Court struck down an
indecency standard for the Internet. Rules restricting online gambling also appear to be
anachronistic at this point.
30. See generally James Crawford, Hold Your Tongue: Bilingualism and the Politics of
'English Only' (1992).
31. "As French culture [and language have] come under increasing pressure with the
widespread availability of English media, the Acaddmie [Fran~aise] has tried to prevent the
Franqaise,
Acadamie
Wikipedia,
language."
French
of the
anglicisation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French academy (last visited Oct. 23, 2005). It is as a direct
result of a decision of the Acaddmie that the French word for "computer" is "ordinateur" and
that the field of study dealing with computers is known as "informatique" (informatics),
from the contraction of "information" and "automatique." Id.; see also David G. Post, "The
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us like thought control. Individuals are likely to reject such centralized
filtering attempts.
Governments can, of course, act on atoms.
Governments create
enforceable barriers and borders and speed limits that affect behavior. We
will respond to force when it is used to compel us to modify our actions,
and we have entire systems of criminal justice that are based on this
premise. But shaping a road barrier, mandating a speed limit, or requiring a
nutritional disclaimer are all governmental acts that are entirely different
from requiring that boundaries to information flows be erected and
maintained.
II. CONGRESS AND "REGULATING THE INTERNET"
The United States claims pride of place as the inventor of the Internet,
and it is beyond question that U.S. government funding (and
interoperability requirements) made the Internet possible. How has the U.S.
Congress dealt with the complexities of information flow membranes
online?
A. The Hands-OffApproach
The clearest statement of Congressional purpose when grappling with
Internet information flows is found in Section 509 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230:
(a) FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following: (1) The rapidly
developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services
available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in
the availability of educational and informational resources to our
citizens.... (4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation....
(b) POLICY. It is the policy of the United States... (2) to preserve
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
32
State regulation ....
In this section, Congress explicitly elected not to impose common carrier
obligations (regulating content, prices, or access by others) on interactive
computer services. Prior to the enactment of § 230, interactive and
computer service providers faced fearsome potential liability for content
created by third parties because of two key (and inconsistent) court
decisions. 33 Congress listened to the concerns of interactive service
Free Use of Our Faculties": Thomas Jefferson, Cyberspace, and the Languages of Social
Life, 49 Drake L. Rev. 407 (2001).
32. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 137-39
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000)).
33. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nassau Cty. May 24, 1995).
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providers and enacted § 230 to protect them from liability for content
created by others so as to avoid hampering online service innovation. As
the Fourth Circuit held in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,34 "[b]y its plain
language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating with a
third-party user of the service." 35 Since its adoption, § 230 has been
construed to establish almost universal immunity for service providers that
are sued based on content created by third parties. 36 § 230 was enacted to
support the robust nature of Internet communication and to keep
government interference in information flows to a minimum. 37 Illegal

speech (defamation, obscenity, copyright infringement) continues to be
illegal, but is primarily targeted as a behavior of individual humans rather
than at the membrane level through governmental stemming of particular
flows of data across platforms or technologies.
Congress has continued to legislate in the spirit of § 230. For example,
the Internet Tax Freedom Act 38 has imposed moratoriums since 1998 (now
extended to 2007) on state and local taxes on Internet access and multiple or

discriminatory taxes on e-commerce. 39 The Digital Millennium Copyright

Act ("DMCA"), 40 although rightfully criticized for its broad restrictions on
circumventing copy protection technology, 4 1 enshrines a deal that protects
online service providers from liability for copyright infringement by users if
34. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
35. Id. at 330.
36. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000);
Doe v. Franco Prods., No. 96-4095, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8845 (N.D. Il.June 22, 2000),
aff'd on other grounds, 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp.
44 (D.D.C. 1998); cf Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App.) (ruling by
California lower court that section 230 immunity does not apply when the individual
republishing the statements knew or had reason to know of the falsity of the material being
disseminated), petition for review granted and opinion superseded by 87 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2004).
37. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S.
937 (1998). As the Zeran court explained,
More generally, notice-based liability for interactive computer service providers
would provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for future
lawsuits. Whenever one was displeased with the speech of another party
conducted over an interactive computer service, the offended party could simply
"notify" the relevant service provider, claiming the information to be legally
defamatory. In light of the vast amount of speech communicated through
interactive computer services, these notices could produce an impossible burden
for service providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing
controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability. Because the probable
effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service
provider self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230's statutory purposes, we will
not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact.
Id.
38. Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (2000).
39. Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 108-435, 118 Stat. 2615 (2004) (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 609 note).
40. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and at 28 U.S.C. § 4001).
41. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1095 (2003).
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the provider "expeditiously" removes the infringing material after receiving
notification from the copyright owner.4 2 And Congress has to date not
adopted a widely applicable online privacy law, preferring instead to take a
sectoral approach-grappling with financial privacy 43 and health
45
privacy 4 4 -that applies to both offline and online data.
B. The IntermeddlingApproach
Congressional and prosecutorial efforts to regulate online information
flows by mandating that particular membranes or barriers be put in place
have been met with prolonged litigation and-mostly-have not survived
constitutional scrutiny. Congressional obsession with pornography led to
the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), which would have prohibited
posting "indecent" or "patently offensive" materials in a public forum
online. 4 6 The CDA was declared unconstitutional in a landmark U.S.
Supreme Court decision in 1997.47 The Child Online Protection Act
("COPA") was then enacted into law in 1998,48 and would have prohibited
commercial website operators from offering material that was suitable for
adults but considered "harmful to minors" unless such sites verified the age

42. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
43. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2000).
44. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-91, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
45. Its one excursion into a specialized online privacy law, the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6503 (2004), has not been a success; many sites have
elected simply not to provide interactive services for children under thirteen rather than cope
with the exacting oversight and notice requirements of the Act. See Carrie Kirby, Youth
Privacy Net Law Takes Effect, Many Web Site Operators Worry They'll Lose Money on
Children's Market, S.F. Chron., Apr. 21,
2000, at BI, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/04/2 I/BU 102542.DT
L &type=business); Ben Chamy, The Cost of COPPA: Kids' Site Stops Talking, ZDNet,
Sept. 12, 2000, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595 22-523848.html?legacy=zdnn. A report
by the Electronic Privacy Information Center also noted that
[c]ritics have claimed that the methods outlined by the [Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC")] for verification-sending/faxing signed printed forms,
supplement of credit card numbers, calling toll-free numbers, or forwarding digital
signatures through email-are too costly, cumbersome, and inadequate in
protecting personal information.
Even though new technologies are being
developed, the current verification methods are too slow and impractical. The
process of verification of mails, emails, and credit card numbers may take over a
day. Further, disclosure of credit card information will expose the parents to the
same privacy risks that they are trying to protect their children from and deter them
from using such online services in general. As a consequence, children may
manipulate information to access these websites, and in the long run, online
businesses may ...

eliminate children-focused sites.

Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA), http://www.epic.org/privacy/kids/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2005).
46. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
47. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
48. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 231
(2000)).
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of all visitors. After several years of litigation,
the Supreme Court in June
49
2004 enjoined the enforcement of COPA.
The next information-flow membrane mandate to pass Congress-again,
prompted by legislators' fixation on indecent (but legal) content onlinewas the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"), 50 which required
libraries to install filtering software on all their computers capable of
accessing the Internet in order to hold on to their federal funding. The goal
of this 2000 legislation was to condition provision of such funding on
libraries' use of filters that block access to visual depictions that are harmful
to minors (when accessed by a minor). On June 23, 2003, after another
three years of litigation, the Supreme Court upheld CIPA, with two "swing"
Justices (Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer) suggesting that adults
would be able to ask librarians to unblock legal sites (legal for adult
viewing, if harmful to minors) that had been blocked by the installed
filters. 5' Even though the tie to the CDA was clear-this was another
congressional attempt to eliminate online sexual material using technology
that would also inevitably filter out protected speech-the link to federal
funding made this case one the Justices could decide differently. 52 Indeed,
the federal funding element may have been the crucial difference between
CDA and CIPA. One European commentator noted the CIPA opinion as an
"important shift" by an American legal system that had been "previously
53
critical of government's attempts to regulate Internet access."
Not only has Congress drawn an enormous amount of litigious energy
with its aberrational attempts to pass categorical laws about information
flows online, the global trade reputation of the United States is also being
affected. Recently, the World Trade Organization ("WTO") has challenged
U.S. decisions to declare online gambling by U.S. citizens illegal, claiming
that these restrictions violate trade promises that the United States has
made. 54 The United States interprets the 1961 amendments to 18 U.S.C. §
49. The Court sent the case back down for a trial to evaluate whether technology had
changed in the intervening five years since the law was first declared unconstitutional by the
Third Circuit. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 540 U.S. 1072 (2003).
50. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7001).
51. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
52. Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that "Congress has wide
latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in order to further its policy
objectives.... We have held in two analogous contexts that the Government has broad
discretion to make content-based judgments in deciding what private speech to make
available to the public," and stated that categorical content controls were appropriate in the
dynamic context of the Internet. Id. at 203-04.
53. Marcus Alexander, Filtering the Public Forum, CMLP Self Regulation Review
(June/July 2003), http://www.selfregulation.info/iapcoda/0307xx-selfregulation-review.htm.
54. See James D. Thayer, The Trade of Cross-BorderGambling and Betting: The WTO
Dispute Between Antigua and the United States, 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0013,

http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2004dltr0013.html;
WTO and Online Gambling, The Economist, Nov.

House of Cards; The

18, 2004, at 28,

http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3411641;

available at

The Associated

Press, WTO: US. Should Drop Online Gambling Ban, newsfactor.com, November 11, 2004,

http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?storyid=28343.
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1084, 55 written to address betting on sports over the telephone, to cover

online gambling, and some site operators in the U.S. have been prosecuted
under this interpretation. Antigua had argued to the WTO that the U.S. was
providing half of the world's customers for online gambling services,
despite the illegality of this activity under United States law. At the same
time, Antigua had "sought to provide gambling and betting services to the
56
United States," but the U.S. had condemned such services as illegal.
Under an exception to the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS"), members are permitted to adopt measures that are "necessary to
protect public morals" even if they do not meet "market access" or
"national treatment" standards of GATS, and the U.S. has argued that its
position with respect to gambling fits within this exception. 57 So far, the
WTO has dismissed this "public morals" argument, perhaps because online
gambling is so easily available in the U.S.
More recently, the U.S. effort to regulate email information flows
through requiring accurate header information in emails and opt-out
procedures has met with ridicule around the world. 58 The U.S. is not alone
in this legislative failure. Most legislative measures-in the United States,
59
Europe, and Australia-have had little impact on the spain problem.
55. Pub. L. No. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1084).
56. Thayer, supra note 54, at 2 (citing First Written Submission of Antigua and
Barbuda, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, WT/DS285 (Oct. 1, 2003)); see also BBC, WTO Rules Against U.S.
Gambling Ban, Nov.
11,
2004,
available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/4001793.stm.
57. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1225, 1168 (1994). The U.S. Trade Representative, Robert
Zoellick, has said about this exception, "If this isn't an exception that they should meet, I
don't know what is." Thayer, supra note 54, at 8 (quoting WTO Gambling Decision "deeply
flawed", Reuters, March 25, 2004).
58. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003
("CAN-SPAM"), Pub. L. No. 108-87, 117 Stat. 2699 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-13
and 18 U.S.C. § 1037); see Tom Zeller, Jr., Law BarringJunk EmailAllows a FloodInstead,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2005 at Al ("A year after a sweeping federal antispam law went into
effect, there is more junk e-mail on the Internet than ever.... A survey from Stanford
University in December showed that a typical Internet user now spends about 10 working
days a year dealing with incoming spam."). In a January 2004 press release, Spamhaus also
noted that
[a]gainst the advice of all anti-spain organizations, the U.S. House of
Representatives has passed the CAN-SPAM Act, a bill backed overwhelmingly by
spammers and dubbed the "YOU-CAN-SPAM" Act because it legalizes spamming
instead of banning it ....
From December 11, spamming will be illegal in the UK,
but with 90% of the UK's spain problem originating in the United States, British
users will continue to be flooded, now with 'legal' spain from the U.S.
Press Release, Spamhaus, United States Set to Legalize Spanming on January 1, 2004 (Nov.
22, 2003), http://www.spamhaus.org/news.lasso?article=150.
59. Postini,
Inc.,
Annual
Report
(2005),
http://www.postini.com/whitepapers/?WPID=25. This report noted that even as attention to
the cost and prevention of spain reached a high point in 2004, threats to email systems grew
worse as the incidence of spain remained at seventy-five to eighty percent of email, virus
attacks grew threefold, and directory harvest attacks ("DHA") continued to plague corporate
email servers. See generally id. For a discussion of how peer governance could fix spam,
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These examples of U.S. efforts to regulate online information flows and
membranes are only illustrative; an exhaustive treatment of this subject is
beyond the scope of this Article. My argument is this: Congress took the
right approach, the approach supporting the further growth of the Internet,
in § 230 and in the Internet Service Provider ("ISP") liability sections of the
DMCA. When, more recently, its absorption with pornography has led it to
attempt to lock down information flows online, it has faced enormous
litigation burdens (CDA, COPA, CIPA) and has achieved little successeither because the laws have been struck down as unconstitutional or
because they have had little impact on the ground. More fundamentally,
these efforts are hopelessly inadequate to deal with the scale of the complex
information flows present in the online world.

III. CASE STUDIES: Two FCC PROCEEDINGS
Notwithstanding the inherent difficulty of regulating information flows,
steps are being taken worldwide by governments to constrain the openness
of the Internet and the devices that connect to this network of networks. In
this regard, the telecommunications and other agencies that form part of
national governments are largely ahead of the legislatures in their countries.
In particular, congressional reluctance to "regulate the Internet" in the U.S.
is being overtaken by the eagerness of the FCC to expand its jurisdictional
turf and maintain its relevance in the digital age.
In this part, I focus on two efforts being made by the FCC to (1)
constrain the functioning of digital devices (the broadcast flag proceeding)
and (2) constrain the layer-independence and end-to-end nature of the
Internet (the IP-enabled services proceeding). These two proceedings are at
different stages of maturity. The broadcast flag rule has been struck down
by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on jurisdictional
grounds, and legislation may be introduced to grant the Commission clear
jurisdiction to reissue the rule. Early indications from the IP-enabled
services rulemaking are that broad rules will emerge from the Commission.
A. BroadcastFlagBackground
The broadcast flag is beautifully and effectively named, because it is
neither about broadcast nor limited to the waving of a patriotic "flag."
Indeed, those who learn about the broadcast flag scheme quickly forget that
it is focused on protecting digital television broadcasts and speak generally
about the protection of digital content. And the "flag" is, in a sense, the
least important part of the entire scheme.
Let's begin at the beginning. The flag is a set of bits embedded in a
digital stream (a standard adopted by the Advanced Television Systems
Committee ("ATSC") that signals "the bits following this set of bits are to
spyware, and other online ills, see David R. Johnson et al., The Accountable Internet: Peer
Production ofInternet Governance,9 Va. J.L. & Tech. 9 (2004).
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be protected. '60 The flag is itself a very simple signal. It is the
implementation of the flag that matters.
The broadcast flag rule, 6 1 distilled to its essence, is a mandate that all
consumer electronics manufacturers and information technology companies
ensure that any device that touches digital television content "recognize and
give effect to" the flag by protecting content against unauthorized onward
distribution. The FCC claimed that the rule would protect digital television
("DTV") broadcasts from massive redistribution over the Internet.
The key reason for the adoption of the broadcast flag was the studios'
62
(not the broadcasters') worries about the "Napsterization" of their content.
The threat of digital redistribution is particularly acute for movie studios
and other video content producers because their business models are today
highly dependent on repurposing programming. The current movie studio
business model is based on studios' ability to exploit multiple distribution
streams for each work they produce. Licensing and distribution agreements
for these windows (domestic and international box office, airline
performances, pay-per-view, rental, home sale, satellite, premium and basic
cable, over-the-air broadcast, etc.) result in payment to the studios. If key
(expensive) content files can be found "in the wild," online, the studios'
fear is that no one will pay for them.
In order to avoid this "Napsterization," the FCC established a new,
controversial, and extraordinarily broad regulatory regime that mandated
the use of "authorized" content protection technologies by virtually every
consumer electronics product and computer product-including digital
television sets, digital cable set-top boxes, direct broadcast satellite
("DBS") receivers, personal video recorders ("PVRs"), DVD recorders, D-

60. Advanced Television Sys. Comm., ATSC A/65B: Program and System Information
Protocol
for
Terrestrial
Broadcast
and
Cable
(2003),
available
at

http://www.atsc.org/standards/a 65b.pdf. This standard defines the way that broadcasters
must include program name and content information in TV broadcasts. The Advanced
Television Systems Committee standard defines a "redistribution control" parameter. Id. at
78-79. This is the "broadcast flag" to which receivers of television signals, including PCs
with tuner cards, must adhere.
61. Digital Broad. Content Prot., 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (FCC report, order, and
further notice of proposed rule).
62. "Napsterization" is shorthand for the music industry's claim that rampant online file
trading has led to a substantial diminution in revenues.
The threat [to Hollywood executives] is the specter of a new Napster-like
sensation that would make it easy for Internet users to bypass the studios and to
view and swap movies for free. No service with such wide appeal looms-yetbut studio executives have been studying the music industry's experience with fileswapping services such as Napster. And while no one will say it out loud,
privately they admit they're terrified Hollywood will be Napsterized: that some
college kid will post a movie-swapping program that will explode in popularity,
swiftly creating a ravenous audience of millions of users who will expect free
access to Hollywood blockbusters.
Laura Rich, Analysis:

Hollywood Braces for 'Napsterization,' CNN.com, Jan. 10, 2001,

http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/computing/01/10/hollywood.napsterization.idg/.
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VHS recorders, and computers with tuner cards. 63 Specifically, the order
required that all devices or software manufactured after July 2005 that
could receive TV signals (including personal computers ("PCs") equipped
with a tuner card) (1) check for the presence of the flag, (2) store and record
flagged content using "authorized technologies," and (3) allow
transmissions through digital interfaces (and only protected digital
interfaces) only to other devices that had an approved copy-protection
system installed. 6 4 As a practical matter, this meant that the flagged digital
content would thereafter be blocked from distribution (1) to any other
electronic device (like a cell phone or PC or DVD recorder) unless that
device was itself compliant with the flag scheme, or (2) over the Internet. 6 5
In other words, a membrane was mandated by the FCC: "[T]hese kinds of
bits shall not pass through this barrier."
Until the FCC could settle on a new regime for approval of "authorized"
technologies, it itself decided (with a great deal of input from the content
industry) which copy protection technologies manufacturers would be
allowed to use. 66 The FCC's process blocked many proposed new uses of
digital television content that involved transmission over the public
Internet. 6 7 Of the thirteen proposed technologies, at least four originally
included plans for allowing limited transmissions of encrypted flagged
content over the Internet to a specified group of people. 68 Following
objections from the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA")
made to the FCC, three of those companies agreed to drop their Internetrelated plans. 6 9 Thus, all of the approved technologies, save one, prohibited
transmission over the public Internet of flagged content. TiVoGuard, the
lone holdout against the MPAA's forceful demands to the FCC that all
thirteen technology providers revise their plans, itself permitted
63. The rule provided that a digital TV demodulator manufactured after July 2005 could

not lawfully send unprotected (unencrypted) content to any output, except in a set of specific
cases: (1) as analog output (at least until the FCC closes the "analog hole"); (2) through
specific digital output formats which must maintain the presence of the broadcast flag and
are protected by an "Authorized Digital Output Protection Technology;" or, (3) in encrypted
form, to devices that also follow the broadcast flag rules. See DigitalBroad Content Prot.,
18 F.C.C.R. at 23,589.
64. See id.

65. Id.
66. Digital Output Prot. Tech. & Recording Method Certifications, 19 F.C.C.R. 15,876,
15,907 (2004) (FCC order); Certifications for Digital Output Prot., Tech. & Recording
Methods to be Used in Covered Demodulator Prods., 19 F.C.C.R. 4732 (2004) (FCC public
notice).
67. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., All Eyes on TiVo: The Broadcast Flag and the Internet
(2004), availableat http://www.cdt.org/copyright/ 20040726tivoflag.pdf.
68. These four are Thomson's SmartRight Technology, RealNetworks's Helix DRM
Trusted Recorder, Microsoft's Windows Media Digital Rights Management Technology,
and TiVo's TiVo Guard proposal.
69. All save TiVo agreed to insert "time to live" ("TTL") and "round trip time" ("RTT")
limitations in the packets generated by the protection technology. These limitations mean
that packets can travel no more than three hops (in no more than seven milliseconds) before
expiring-so they will not get very far. See Digital Output Prot. Tech. & Recording Method
Certifications, 19 F.C.C.R. at 15,907.
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transmissions only to a single computer with a "dongle" (a small device that
plugs into a computer port that prevents illicit copies of software from
being made) attached or within a constrained personal network. 70 The
broadcast flag scheme thus had an extraordinarily broad scope. It created a
whole new regime of constraining regulation all at once: restrictions on
Internet use; design mandates for consumer electronic equipment, including
the traditionally open-platform PC; and licensing requirements for any
device that connects to the regulated device. Unpredictable, amplifying,
and possibly conflicting results from these downstream effects were likely
to follow (and may still follow if Congress authorizes the Commission to
readopt the order).
In the course of defending its authority to regulate equipment
manufacturers in order to effectuate the flag scheme, the FCC broadly
asserted that it had had jurisdiction since 1934 over any device that was
"associatedwith the overall circuit of messages sent and received over all
interstate radio and wire communication." 7 1 In other words, FCC claimed
that anything that had some relationship with a U.S. wire or radio
communication was subject to its design authority. This breathtaking-and,
as the D.C. Circuit found, illegal-assertion swept within its boundaries all
computers, car radios, VCRs, portable music devices, and bedside alarm
clocks. Although the Commission conceded that this was the first time it
had exercised such jurisdiction over equipment manufacturers, it claimed
that "the nation now stands at a juncture where such exercise of authority is
72
necessary."
B. The Flag andMembranes
Although the broadcast flag proceeding nominally targeted receivers of
television broadcasts, and thus appeared to have limited impact on the rest
of the world of machines-particularly because more than eighty-five
percent of Americans receive television broadcasts through cable and
satellite connections that are subject to different rules 73-its actual scope
was much broader. Our PCs and televisions now collaborate to store and
display live TV, movies, music, videos, and photos across broadband
connections and within home networks. We are all using digital cameras,
70. Id. at 15,887.
71. Brief for Respondents at 17, Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (No. 04-1037).
72. Digital Output Prot. Tech. & Recording Method Certifications, 19 F.C.C.R. at

15,889.
73. See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania: Research at Penn: Business: Television's
Digital
Dilemma
(Aug.
28,
2002),
http://www.upenn.edu/researchatpenn/article.php?427&bus.
As for digital cable and
satellite TV, the content industry made a direct deal with cable and satellite broadcasters to
impose content protection controls on all future television devices. The resulting negotiated
rules were approved as part of the "Plug & Play" proceeding that facilitated the direct
connection of digital navigation devices or other customer premises equipment to cable
television systems. Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices & Compatibility Between

Cable Sys. & Consumer Elec. Equip., 68 Fed. Reg. 35,818 (Jun. 17, 2003).
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camcorders, and phones that behave like cameras. No manufacturer of any
one of these devices would want to invest in creating two lines of
products-one to consort with devices that have something to do with
television broadcast content, and one to live in a world unconnected to
television. The goal-and the operating assumption-of manufacturers is
convergence of the various devices they work with, not separation. Thus,
the impact of this rule was designed to be felt across all consumer
electronics devices.
This was a direct attack on the openness of these many devices. It was
an attack on their ability to connect to other devices and the Internet, to
permit transformation and combination of digital content, and to allow for
the voluntary creation of information flow membranes. To the extent that
any manufacturer of any device wished to have that device connect to
devices that touched broadcast content, that manufacturer would have had
to comply with the licensing rules authorized by the flag proceeding-which in turn would have limited interoperability to those devices that were
themselves compliant. 74 This meant that the device would have had to
ensure that its digital outputs were constrained by an Authorized Digital
Output Protection Technology. It could not have stored or recorded this
content unless access by a noncompliant device to that content could not
occur. 75 And once a device was trained to recognize and adhere to the
demands of the broadcast flag, there was no reason that many more
varieties of digital content would not have been similarly flagged. 76 Open
devices that allowed information flows in and out, permitted snippets of
content to be mixed with other information and made into a transformative
work, and allowed unauthorized access to the results of these
transformations were on the way to being forbidden.
The broadcast flag scheme adopted by the FCC (one that Congress may
authorize in the wake of the May 2005 D.C. Circuit ruling striking it down)
may have been just a first step towards a much more constrained future
world of devices. 77 It is a step that will be echoed across the world.
78
Canada will likely move quickly to create a broadcast flag regime.
74. 47 C.F.R. § 73.9004 (2005).

75. Id.
76. Broadcasters may choose to use their new spectrum for multi-casting several lowerresolution streams at once-making new digital services possible. There is no limit on the
nature of the material to which flags can be applied by broadcasters; wide swathes of data in
the public domain could be flagged just as easily as first-run movies.
77. Some might say that the real question is "what can be flagged," rather than "can
flagged content traverse the Internet." Because flagging is so easy and subject to no
constraints, it will be widely adopted-and may cover public domain content, factual
material unprotected by copyright, and news. It is not politically feasible or practically
possible to put the genie back in the bottle and mandate limits on what can be flagged.
78. See Michael Geist, Advancing Technology Threatens Cultural Policy, Toronto Star,
Nov. 8, 2004, at D3; Michael Geist, Mr. Minister, Please Protect the Public Interest,
Toronto Star, Sept. 6, 2004, at C2; Radio Advisory Board of Canada, Key Industry Canada
2005
(2004),
Priorities
for
Activities
and
http://www.rabc.ottawa.on.ca/e/Files/5.%201C%2ORpt.doc (stating that standards priority
work for 2005 will include "recognition of the broadcast flag").
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Moreover, member states of the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") 7 9 are continuing work on a treaty 80 that is planned to protect
broadcasting signals and webcasts. 8 1 The current draft of this treaty, which
is being pushed hard by the MPAA through U.S. officials, states that the
member states "recogniz[e] the need to introduce new international rules in
order to provide adequate solutions to the questions raised by economic,
social, cultural and technological developments" 82 and grants to
broadcasters (and potentially webcasters) for a term of fifty years "the
exclusive right of authorizing the retransmission [defined very broadly to
include all forms of communication of a broadcast by anyone, including
83
over computer networks] by any means of their broadcasts."
Thus, this treaty would give broadcasters, cablecasters, and, under the
U.S. proposal, webcasters, a broad range of new exclusive rights. Although
the most recent WIPO discussion of this treaty ended in confusion when the
chairman of the responsible committee (in a transparent effort to push the
treaty along and isolate dissenters) suddenly called for a vote rather than
continuing to work for consensus, 8 4 it is likely that worldwide protections
for broadcasters, webcasters, and the "technical protection measures" they
use will be agreed to in some form. It is my view that this treaty is likely to
form the basis for global adoption of broadcast flag schemes modeled on
the U.S. version.
C. IP-EnabledServices Background
On March 10, 2004, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
for IP-enabled services. 85 The FCC made clear that "the scope of this
proceeding-and the term 'IP-enabled services,' as it is used hereincludes services and applications relying on the Internet Protocol
family." 8 6 Thus, the IP-Enabled Services Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
suggests that the Commission views its regulatory authority as extending to
end-user software, network hardware, corporate and community websites
and more.
79. "WIPO is an intergovernmental organization based in Geneva, Switzerland
responsible for the promotion of the protection of intellectual rights throughout the world. It
is one of the 16 specialized agencies of the United Nations system of organizations." ICANN
Glossary, http://www.icann.org/general/glossary.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
80. WIPO, Member States, http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/member-states.jsp (last
visited Oct. 19, 2005).
81. World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on Copyright and
Related Rights, Twelfth Session, Revised ConsolidatedText for a Treaty on the Protectionof
Broadcasting Organizations, SCCR/12/2
(Oct.
4,
2004),
available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_12/sccr_12_2.doc.
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id.at 39.
84. Carolyn Deere, WIPO Broadcasting Treaty Discussions End in Controversy,
Confusion, Intell. Prop. Watch, Nov. 22, 2004, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?
p= 10&res = 1024 ff&print=0.
85. IP-Enabled Servs., 19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (2004) (FCC notice of proposed rulemaking).
86. Id. at 4864 n. 1.
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In the IP Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission, while
acknowledging that the Internet had "become one of the greatest drivers of
consumer choice and benefit, technical innovation, and economic
development in the United States in the last ten years," 87 stated that
"provisions designed to ensure disability access, consumer protection,
emergency 911 service, law enforcement access for authorized wiretapping
purposes, consumer privacy, and others [social policy concerns]-should
continue to have relevance as communications migrate to IP-enabled
services." 88 The IP Notice of Proposed Rulemaking suggests that
traditional "common carrier" regulation, in which service providers file
tariffs, respond to interconnection obligations, and pay access fees, may not
be appropriate for IP-enabled services. 89 But the IP Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking indicates that
"social policies" may be appropriate for some or
90
all IP-enabled services.
On August 9, 2004, the FCC released its Communications Assistance for
91
Law Enforcement ("CALEA") Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
suggesting that some subset of IP-enabled services should be designed so as
to assist law enforcement officials in implementing wiretap orders. The IP
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and CALEA Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking are closely linked, and together suggest that online services are
subject to "social policy" rules established by the FCC-including the
policy that some services be required to build in basic wiretap capabilities.
One key reason for the release of the IP and CALEA Notices was the
desire of incumbent telephone companies to maintain a level regulatory
playing field in the Internet era. Calls made with VolP services that
connect to the traditional telephone network (the "PSTN") are twenty
percent to thirty percent less expensive than calls made using the PSTN,
because the Internet is not taxed the way the PSTN is. And calls made with
VoIP that do not connect to the PSTN are often completely free or very low
cost.92 This causes heartaches for companies that base their business model
on the PSTN, because they are stuck with providing universal telephone
service, 911 emergency services, guaranteeing wiretapping access for
police, and providing access for the hearing-impaired-and are subject to
extensive taxes and fees imposed by the FCC and the states. The rise of
87. Id. at 4864.
88. Id. at 4867.
89. Id.
90. Id. The IP-Enabled Services Notice of Proposed Rulemaking focuses on questions
relating to emergency services, access by individuals with disabilities, consumer protection,
and universal service. The FCC uses the term "social policy concerns" as shorthand for this
list of issues plus the issues raised in the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See IP-EnabledServs., 19 F.C.C.R. at 4879-80.
91. Commc'ns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband Access & Servs., 19
F.C.C.R. 15,676 (2004) (FCC notice of proposed rulemaking and declaratory ruling).
92. Voice of IP ("VoIP") is an IP-enabled service-transmitting telephone calls over a
data network, using packet-switching to save costs. See NOVACON: Glossary of Internet
Terms, Chicago Comparison, VolP, http://www.novacon.com/faq_s-z.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2005).
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VoIP also causes heartaches for state and federal government. As more
people begin using unregulated VoIP applications instead of the taxed
traditional telephone system, federal and state governments will start to lose
billions of dollars.
By the third quarter of 2003, at least fifteen states either had begun to
regulate or were considering the regulation of IP voice offerings. 93 In
particular, in September 2003, the California State Public Utilities
Commission ("PUC") told six VoIP companies that connect to the PSTN to
94
get a license in order to provide phone services to people in California.
Minnesota and New York went the other direction, ruling that VoIP
providers-even those connecting to the PSTN-were not subject to state
taxing and tariffing. 95 Both the California and New York PUCs announced
that they would pull back, giving the FCC time to come up with rules for
VoIP. The March 2004 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was at least in part
a response to these state efforts. Vonage, a VoIP company that connects to
the PSTN, had successfully called for FCC preemption of any state taxes or
96
regulation of VoIP.
A second reason for the breadth of the IP and CALEA Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking was FCC's desire to maintain its relevance in an era
of decreasing reliance on telephones. 97 The old world of circuit-switched
networks and monopoly providers, on which FCC's regulatory scheme
depended, is rapidly being replaced by a new age of packet-switched
networks for which scarcity simply is not an issue. 98 To date, and with very

93. See Comments of SBC Communications, Inc. at 5-6, Vonage Holding Corp.'s
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, WC Docket No. 03-211 (Oct. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.neca.org/wawatch/wwpdf/102803_36.pdf.
94. The Director of the California Public Utilities Commission, John Leutza, noted that
the distinction between land and Internet phone providers was minimal. Ben Chamy,
California to Regulate VoIP Providers, CNET News.com, Sept. 30, 2003,
http://news.com.com/Califomia+to+regulate+VoIP+providers/2100-7352_3-5084711 .html.
95. The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission ("PUC") ruled that Vonage's VolP
service was an intrastate telephone service, subject to state law. Vonage Holdings Corp.'s
Petition for a Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n,
19 F.C.C.R. 22,404 (2004) (memorandum opinion and order); see also Vonage Holdings
Corp. v. Minn. Public Utilities Commission, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D. Minn. 2003). Vonage
was able to have the Public Utilities Commission's determination overturned on appeal when
a federal judge held that VolP is an information service not subject to state jurisdiction.
Linda Haugsted, States Wrestle with VolP Approaches; As Cable Ops and Others Jump into
New Phone Frontier, Regulators Eye Turf Defenses, Vonage Press Room, Jan. 5, 2004,
http://www.vonage.com/corporate/press news.php?PR=200401 05_1.
96. Vonage Petitionfor a DeclaratoryRuling, 19 F.C.C.R. at 22,404.
97. This is similar to the Interstate Commerce Commission's effort to retain its
relevance as the national transportation landscape evolved. See Paul Dempsey, The
Insterstate Commerce Commission-Disintegrationof an American Legal Institution, 34
Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1984-85).
98. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the BroadbandEra, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925 (2001); Jonathan
Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommunications Services, " Universal Service
Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 Yale J. on
Reg. 211, 225-38 (1999) ("Packet-switched networks are taking over, and the
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modest exceptions that can be directly tied to the FCC's
telecommunications authority, the FCC has not had much to say about
"regulating the Internet." 9 9
Over the last thirty years, the FCC has, however, had something to say
about regulating computers-and it has decided to leave them alone.
Beginning in 1971, the FCC conducted three proceedings (called Computer
I, Computer II, and Computer III) about the relationships between computer
data processing (computers used to direct network operations) and
telecommunications (end users using computers to communicate) which
resulted in FCC pronouncements that where data was transformed by
computers in use by common carriers before being presented to human end
users, these services (called "enhanced services") would be "unregulated"
by the FCC. 100
Basic services, by contrast, which provided only
transmission of communications, would be regulated under FCC's
"common carrier" Title II regime. 10 1 The Commission predicted, correctly,
that the development and availability of "enhanced services" would best be
promoted if regulatory rules and procedures were not "interjected between
1' 02
technology and its marketplace applications."
The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act")
represented a codification of this "unregulation" approach. The Act defined
"Information Services" as "the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic
publishing." 10 3 The Commission stated that "information services consist
of all services that the Commission previously considered to be enhanced
communications world is changing."); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70
(1997).

99. The FCC did impose conditions in connection with approving the AOL/Time
Warner merger, requiring that AOL's instant messaging client interoperate with competitors
and that Time Warner should make capacity on its cable systems available for Internet
access by competitors. But the FCC's power to impose these conditions was founded
exclusively on the FCC's approval of transfers of licenses for Time Warner's cable
companies, broadcast companies, and telephone interests to the merged entity. See
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. & Am. Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner
Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547 (2001) (FCC opinion and order).
100. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979) (tentative decision and further notice of inquiry
and rulemaking), rule modification granted by 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final decision),
reconsidered,84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1981), further reconsidered, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), affd
sub nom. Computer & Comm'cns Indus. Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied sub. nom, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 461 U.S. 938 (1983), aff'd on
second further reconsideration,56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 301 (1984) (FCC opinion and

order).
101. Common carriers are subject to rate regulation, tariffs, and co-location rules. Wire
or Radio Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-229 (2000); see Orloff v. FCC, 124 S.Ct.
2907 (2004).
102. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm 'n's Rules & Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d at

429.
103. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2000).
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services." 10 4 This signaled that all "information services"-an apparently
broad category of computer-assisted communications-would
be
"unregulated" by the FCC (as "enhanced services" had been). 10 5 In
particular, as discussed in Part I, the Act mandated as "policy of the United
States" that development and use of the Internet be "unfettered by federal or
10
state regulation."'

6

But as the Internet world continued to explode, some of the regional Bell
operating companies-heavily regulated by the FCC-supported the FCC's
call for "social polices" to be applied to IP-enabled services. 10 7 Chairman
Michael Powell, in a separate statement accompanying the IP-enabled
services Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, said "rules designed to ensure law
enforcement access, universal service,1 08 disability access and emergency
104. Implementation of Sections 255 & 251(a)(2) of the Commc'ns Act of 1934, as
Enactedby the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 16 F.C.C.R. 6417, 6450 n.180 (1999) (FCC report,
order, and further notice of inquiry).
105. IP-enabled services convert information from one form to another, process, retrieve
and store information, and perform many other functions that constitute information
services, including facilitating subscriber interaction with stored information (such as
customer profiles). They thus are classified as "information services" to which Title II and
certain other regulations do not apply. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (defining "information service").
By contrast, "telecommunications services," which are subject to Title II regulations, are
defined as "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information
of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received." Id. § 153(43), (46) (2000) (defining "telecommunications"
and
"telecommunications service").
106. Id. § 230(b)(2).
107. See Comments of the Verizon Telephone Companies at 1, IP-Enabled Servs., WC
Docket
No.
04-36
(May
28,
2004),
available
at
http://www.neca.org/wawatch/wwpdf/060204_86.pdf (arguing that IP-enabled services are
not subject to traditional forms of economic regulation, but should be subject to "discrete
requirements only when necessary to support specific policy objectives"); Comments of
SBC Communications Inc. at 57, Vonage Holding Corp.'s Petition for Declaratory Ruling,
WC
Docket
No.
03-211
(Oct.
27,
2003),
available
at
http://www.neca.org/wawatch/wwpdf/l02803_36.pdf ("The Commission's assertion of
jurisdiction to address the public policy concerns surrounding IP-enabled services would not
remotely thwart, and is indeed necessary to promote, the substantive policy goals of the
Communications Act."). As BellSouth argued,
To the extent that a particular IP-enabled service is an "information service" under
the law, the Commission should leave such services largely unregulated except to
the extent that, under its Title I authority, the Commission needs to establish clear
expectations with regard to social obligations such as public safety, universal
service, 911 and disability access.
Comments of BellSouth Corporation at 23, IP-Enabled Servs., WC Docket No. 04-36 (May
28,
2004),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/SilverStream/Pages/edocsAdvanceSearch.html;
cf
Comments of Qwest Communications International Inc. at 36, IP-Enabled Servs., WC
Docket No. 04-36 (May 28, 2004), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.
cgi?native orpdf=pdf&id-document=6516199524 (advocating that the Commission should
exercise its ancillary jurisdiction to apply noneconomic regulations to IP-enabled services
and applications only on a showing of necessity to achieve an important objective under the
Telecommunications Act).
108. "Universal service" is a shorthand designation for a very complicated set of implicit
and explicit subsidies initiated in the 1930s that attempt to provide phone service to everyone
in the U.S. regardless of distance from central switches or ability to pay. FCC, Universal
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719

911 service can and should be preserved in the new architecture."' 10 9 The
FCC had found a new role for itself: ensuring "social policy" structures in
the online world. This would enable the FCC to remain relevant and
necessary in the age of the Interet, while not extending all of the old
economic tariffing rules to online services.
There is substantial tension between this. stance and the FCC's overall
deregulatory (or "unregulatory") agenda. When Pulver.com filed a petition
for a declaratory rulemaking with the FCC, asking that its Free World
Dialup ("FWD") service (which is essentially an instant messaging service
with voice capabilities that does not connect to the traditional telephone
system) be declared not to be a "telecommunications service," the FCC
responded that FWD was an "unregulated information service subject to
FCC's jurisdiction." 1" 0 In other words, the FCC put FWD in the bucket of
services that are not subject to tariffs and rate regulation under Title II of
the Communications Act. 111 In general, then-Chairman Powell was vocal
in his support for an "unregulated" Internet, at one point telling USA
Today, "If you're going to say to me that Voice over IP is something that
needs regulation, then you're going to have to explain to me why e-mail
isn't also, or streaming video or instant messaging is not also."' 12
Some media outlets read this "unregulation" and "nonregulation"
language to mean that Internet applications would remain unregulated by
the FCC. 113 But "unregulation" does not mean "no regulation." "Social
Service Home Page, http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/universalservice/welcome.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2005) (providing the FCC's definition of "universal service").
109. IP-Enabled Servs., 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4951 (2004) (notice of proposed rulemaking,
separate statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell); see also IP-Enabled Servs., 19
F.C.C.R. at 4893.
Congress stated that the Internet should remain free from regulation. But Congress
also has stated public policy goals that would presumably continue to apply as
communications networks evolve. For example, it has stated that universal service
should be maintained, that telecommunications equipment and services should
remain usable by people with disabilities, that prompt emergency service should be
available to the public through the 911 system, and that communications should be
accessible to law enforcement officers acting on the basis of a lawfully obtained
warrant.
Id. (footnote omitted). All of these "public policy goals" have been expressed in the past by
Congress with respect only to telecommunications services-common carriers.
110. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup Is Neither
Telecomms. Nor a Telecomms. Serv., 19 F.C.C.R. 3307, 3307 (2004).
111. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
112. Reuters, FCC ChiefPlans No Internet Phone Regulation, USA Today, Jan. 22, 2004,

at lB.
113. The headline for the FCC's press release announcing the pulver.com decision read,
"FCC Rules that pulver.com's Free World Dialup Service Should Remain Free From
Unnecessary Regulation," and many people understood this to mean that IP-enabled services
would not be subject to any rules imposed by the FCC. Press Release, Fed. Commc'n
Comm'n, FCC Rules That pulver.com's Free World Dialup Service Should Remain Free
at
available
2004),
12,
(Feb.
Regulation
Unnecessary
from
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-243869A1.pdf, see, e.g., Interview
with Jeff Pulver, Co-founder, Vonage, BroadBandReports.com (Feb. 18, 2004),
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/39049 ("Your victory, thanks to years of effort, for the
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policies," including design mandates under CALEA and payment into
Universal Service funds, were envisioned by the FCC to be part of
"unregulation." Although it is still quite unclear what social policies the
FCC will require of what categories of IP-enabled services, the FCC's
stance is consistent: The Commission strongly believes it has the authority
to bring social policies to bear on the Internet, and has put forth a menu of
such policies that it believes may apply to IP-enabled services.
D. CALEA Background 14
Unlike the flag context, in which we have a fully articulated (if
temporarily stalled) regime to look at, most of the IP-enabled
services/CALEA "social policies" rulemaking is still wide open for
discussion. But the CALEA process signals that the FCC may take the
view that permission will be needed from government authorities when
designing a wide variety of services, computers, and web sites that use the
Internet protocol. In other words, information flow membranes will be
governmentally mandated as part of the design process for online products
and services.
Under the federal wiretap statute, all electronic communications-no
matter whether they are in the form of faxes, emails, or VoIP calls--can be
intercepted legally if a wiretap order has been obtained."I5 Any provider of
any electronic communications service is required to furnish information
6
and technical assistance for such an interception. 1
With the rise of digital telephony in the early 1990s, law enforcement
was worried that new digital systems would be more difficult to tap than
analog systems, and wanted to ensure that it would be able speedily to
implement wiretap orders. Law enforcement may also have wanted to shift
the cost of adjusting to different telecommunications carriers' systems to
the carriers themselves. After substantial narrowing negotiations, CALEA
was enacted in 1994.117
CALEA requires that telecommunications
time being frees [Free World Dial-Up] and other 'pure' VoIP providers from regulation. Do
you expect further battles down the road?").
114. Some portions of this section appear in revised form in Susan P. Crawford, Someone
to Watch over Me: Social Policies for the Internet (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
115. Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral
Communications, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). Thus, cable companies, broadband
access providers generally, and VoIP service providers are all already subject to a
surveillance assistance requirement. Id. § 2518(4).
116. See id. § 2518(4).
117. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2522 and 47 U.S.C. §§ 229, 1001-1010 (2000)). Then-Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director Louis Freeh said during a joint congressional hearing on the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") in 1994 that a broader bill covering all
communications service providers had been "rejected out of hand." J. Hearings on H.R. 4922
and S. 2375 Before the Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary
and the Subcomm. on Civil and Const'l Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd
Cong. 49 (1994).
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providers--common carriers of telephone communications, 1 8-provide
certain specific capacities and capabilities to make wiretapping easier for
law enforcement.
Even though the Internet had not come into common use in 1994,
Congress was then well aware of the differences between circuit-switched
and packet-switched networks that I have described above. 1 9 Congress
120
specifically elected to leave Internet services out of CALEA's coverage.
With the increasing popularity of VolP services, law enforcement
became concerned that it would become difficult to wiretap online
communications that, from their perspective, were equivalent to traditional
telephone calls. In March 2004, the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the
Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") filed a joint petition asking the FCC to begin a
rulemaking proceeding focused on CALEA implementation for broadband
access services and broadband telephony. 12 1 Shortly thereafter, bills were
introduced in both the Senate 122 and House 123 that would have given the
FCC express jurisdiction over VoIP, but neither bill had passed either the
Senate or the House at the time this Article was prepared.
On August 9, 2004, when the FCC released its CALEA Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking, it said,
[T]he Commission tentatively concludes that CALEA applies to facilitiesbased providers of any type of broadband Internet access serviceincluding wireline, cable modem, satellite, wireless, and powerline-and
to managed or mediated Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") services.
These tentative conclusions are based on a Commission proposal that
for a substantial
these services fall under CALEA as "a replacement
124
portion of the local telephone exchange service."

118. 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(A).
119. See supra note 17.

120. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2); see also U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,
455 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("CALEA does not cover 'information services' such as e-mail and
Internet access."); H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 23 (1994) as reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3503 (stating that CALEA obligations "do not apply to information
services, such as electronic mail services, or on-line services, such as Compuserve, Prodigy,
America On-line or Mead Data, or Internet service providers"). The Commission has found
that information services "such as electronic mail providers and on-line service providers"
are exempt from CALEA. Commc'ns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 15 F.C.C.R.
7105, 7119 (1999) (FCC second report & order).
121. Joint Petition for Expedited Rulemaking, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation & Drug Enforcement Admin. Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve Various
Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Commc'ns Assistance for Law
10, 2004), available at
Enforcement Act, RM No. 10865 (FCC Mar.
http://www.askcalea.net/docs/20040310.calea.jper.pdf.
122. VoIP Regulatory Freedom Act of 2004, S. 2281, 108th Cong.
123. Advanced Internet Communications Services Act of 2004, H. 4757, 108th Cong.
124. Press Release, Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, FCC Adopts Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling Regarding Communications Assistance for Law
at
available
2004),
(Aug.
4,
Act
Enforcement
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-250547A3 .pdf.
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Then, on August 5, 2005 the FCC ruled that broadband Internet access
and "interconnected VoIP" services must be designed so as to make
125
government wiretapping easier.
The strength of the Commission's arguments for CALEA application to
broadband services and VoIP will come under immediate scrutiny, because
there is an exemption under section 102(8) of CALEA for "information
services," and VolP is an "information service." 126 In a comment
accompanying the August 5, 2005 press release, FCC Commissioner
Kathleen Abernathy noted the weakness of the FCC's legal claim, saying,
Because litigation is as inevitable as death and taxes, and because some
might not read the statute to permit the extension of CALEA to the
broadband Internet access and VoIP services at issue here, I have stated
my concern that an approach like the one we adopt today is not without
127
legal risk.

Thus, in sum, the FCC interpreted the CALEA statute (which focused
exclusively on digital technology within the PSTN) to address online
information applications-a category of technologies specifically excluded
from CALEA's scope. Indeed, filed comments in the CALEA proceeding
suggest that law enforcement authorities are interested in having CALEA
12 8
apply to all online applications.
What VoIP services would be required to do to assist law enforcement
remains quite unclear. Under CALEA, telecommunications carriers are
required to (1) enable law enforcement, pursuant to a court order or other
lawful authorization, to access "call-identifying information" that is
"reasonably available" to the carrier, and (2) to deliver access to callidentifying information in a format that may be transmitted to a remote
location. It appears that in requesting that CALEA be extended to Internet
services, law enforcement will likely demand that standardized information
be created in a form acceptable to them. The only limitation proposed in
the CALEA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on this subject is that
information will not be considered to be "reasonably" available if the
125. Press Release, Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, FCC Requires Certain Broadband and VoIP
Providers to Accommodate Wiretaps, Order Stikes Balance Between Law Enforcement,
Innovation (Aug. 5, 2005).
126. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
127. Statement of Kathleen Q. Abernathy, FCC Commissioner, In re Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement and Broadband Access and Services (Aug. 5, 2005),
availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260434A3.pdf.
128. Comments of Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General for the State of New York at 9-10,
Commc'ns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband Access and Servs., ET
Docket
No.
04-295
(FCC
Nov.
8.
2004),
available
at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/teleconununications/filings/agcalea.pdf;
Comments of the
United States Department Of Justice at 32-33, Commc'ns Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act & Broadband Access & Services, ET Docket No. 04-295 (FCC Nov. 8, 2004), available
at http://www.askcalea.com/docs/20041108_dojcomments.pdf [hereinafter DOJ CALEA
Comments] (arguing that involvement in any ongoing flow of information among Internet
users should be considered "management," and any online services may be included in this
category-not just those that interconnect with the traditional telephone network).
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information is only accessible by "significantly modifying a network." 129
This is very little protection for Internet services, and it seems likely that
such services will end up implementing data and functionality designs that
are pleasing to law enforcement. More importantly, "call identifying
information" is specifically not supposed to be available under CALEA
where such information "may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber" in the absence of a lawful court order (more than just a pen
register or trap and trace order). 130 Online, of course, all Internet
communications "may disclose" this information-IP addresses can
sometimes perform this function, and the Session Initiation Protocol13used
1
for many VoIP calls will convey the physical location of the end user.
So far, law enforcement has refused to say what it means by "call
identifying information" for the Internet, 132 and has suggested that such
information may be different for different entities. 133 Law enforcement
would like the discretion to negotiate with technology companies over what
is meant by "call identifying information" and in what form it must be sent
to them. 134 Just as innovators in content protection technologies were
beaten down by the MPAA when they wanted to allow encrypted content to
traverse the public Internet in the flag proceedings, here the FBI will
preapprove the design and capabilities of Internet services-with a great
deal of enforcement power behind it. Law enforcement wants to decide,
once a general rule is in place, what products or services are covered by
CALEA, what information is required to be furnished to them and in what
form, and who should pay for what.
Most critically for the future of the Internet, law enforcement in the
CALEA proceeding has made clear that it wants to ensure that it reviews all
possibly relevant new services for compliance with unstated informationgathering and information-forwarding requirements before these services
are launched. All prudent businesses will want to run their services by law
enforcement, suggests the DOJ: "Service providers would be well advised
to seek guidance early, preferably well before deployment of a service, if
they believe that their service is not covered by CALEA.... DOJ would

129. Commc'ns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband Access & Servs., 19
F.C.C.R. 15,676, 15,714 (2004) (FCC notice of proposed rulemaking and declaratory
ruling).
130. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2000).
13 1. The Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF") is working on exactly this issue. See
James M. Polk & Brian Rosen, Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet Draft,
Requirements for Session Initiation Protocol Conveyance (Oct. 25, 2004),
http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sipping/draft-ietf-sipping-location-requirements/draft-ietf-sippinglocation-requirements-02.txt.
132. DOJ CALEA Comments, supra note 128, at 42.
133. Id.at 7.
134. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has stated that it prefers to use a secondary,
negotiating process under CALEA that can only take place after a particular service has
entered the marketplace and been found wanting by law enforcement (the "deficiency
process") to discuss the meaning of "call identifying information." Id.at 42.
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certainly consider a service provider's failure to request such guidance in
135
any enforcement action."
This is a threat: Come negotiate with us first, or you will run the risk of
being subject to penalties later. And, of course, innovators will not know to
what standards they are being held during these negotiations-what "call
identifying information" means on the Internet, what form service providers
will have to provide it in, or what capabilities they will have to provide law
enforcement. Most alarmingly of all, these negotiations will inevitably end
up in design mandates; according to the DOJ, "any definition of 'reasonably
available' [call identifying information] should be based on the technical
solutions a carrier and vendor can achieve when they first design the
network, not on the unfortunate realities that prevail after a non-compliant
136
network has already been constructed."
E. IP-EnabledServices andMembranes
The threats to collective creation of information-flow membranes posed
by the IP-enabled/CALEA rulemakings are clear. The DOJ will seek to
penalize service providers that do not submit their applications for prelaunch CALEA review. Law enforcement will want to bring "deficiency"
proceedings against any online service or application provider that they
deem to be covered by CALEA.
What does this foretaste of the FCC's likely actions on CALEA signal
for the open Internet? The central presumption of Internet innovation will
likely be flipped as a result of this proceeding: Instead of "everything not
prohibited is permitted," the new default setting will be "everything not
permitted is prohibited." All new online services will eventually be subject
to law enforcement "compliance" review before they go on the market.
There is no limiting principle for law enforcement's interpretation of its
need: Because a voice bit is indistinguishable from a data bit, all services
will eventually be covered by the DOJ's interpretation of CALEA. And we
will not know until later what law enforcement's design mandates will be,
because all of this will be negotiated behind closed doors. All prudent
businesses seeking to avoid deficiency findings will feel the need to go ask
permission before launching. So CALEA will be a high and expensive
barrier to innovation. Smaller outfits will simply crumble rather than go
through pre-launch law enforcement review, collaborative and open-source
innovations will not pass law enforcement's tests, and a pall of uncertainty
will be cast over the entire scene. In sum, the FCC through this expansion
of CALEA will create mandatory membranes for applications that are used
online.

135. Id. at 36 n.123, 38.
136. Id. In many other places in its filing, DOJ makes clear that it is seeking prelaunch
review of services that it might interpret are subject to CALEA obligations. For example,
according to DOJ, "CALEA's purpose [is] to ensure solutions are built in pre-deployment."
Id. at 21.
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As with the push for the broadcast flag, the push for extension of
CALEA to the Internet (and for delegation of broad design discretion to law
enforcement) is being echoed worldwide.
The Council of Europe's
Convention on Cybercrime (signed by the United States but not yet
ratified) 137 broadly requires service providers to provide assistance to law
1 38
enforcement for lawful interception of all electronic communications.
Each ratifier of the Convention is required to "empower its competent
authorities" to "compel" service providers, "within [their] existing technical
capability," to cooperate and assist the competent authorities in the
interception and recording of both "traffic data"'139 and "content data" in
140
real time of communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
And service providers are to be obliged to "keep confidential the fact of and
any information about the execution of any power provided for" in these
surveillance provisions.' 4 1 These are broader requirements than any
137. The terms of the Convention required that it would enter into force only once it had
been ratified by five countries, at least three of which were Member States of the Council of
Europe. In July 2004 the Convention entered into force, having been ratified by Albania,
Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania. Sen. Lugar's Foreign Relations
Committee held a mostly favorable hearing on the Convention in June 2004. It is likely that
the U.S. will ratify the Convention in 2005. An optional additional protocol on hate speech
will likely not be ratified by the U.S., and indeed has not yet (as of September 2005) been
ratified by any countries. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 282,
availableat http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/HtmlU185.htm; Additional Protocol
to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and
Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, Jan. 28, 2003, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Htmll 89.htm.
138. For text of the treaty, see Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 137. Intellectual
property and surveillance concerns often converge; article 10.1 of the Convention includes
vague language suggesting that infringement using a computer system should be
criminalized: "Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the infringement of
copyright.., where such acts are committed willfully, on a commercial scale and by means
of a computer system." Id. art. 10, § 1.
139. "'[T]raffic data' means any computer data relating to a communication by means of
a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of
communication, indicating the communication's origin, destination, route, time, date, size,
duration, or type of underlying service." Id. art. l(d). "Content data" is not defined in the
Convention. VeriSign, in its comments to the FCC in connection with the CALEA
proceeding, takes the position that the CALEA term "call identifying information" for
Internet communications should be taken to mean "traffic data" as defined in the
Convention, and that
[a]ll object-to-object communication should constitute realtime traffic data, not
content. Only humans generate "content." Because the privacy protections
accorded to human communications "content" impose such substantial overheads,
complexities, and costs on both providers and law enforcement to implement those
protections, the definition of "content" in the context of CALEA should be
narrowly construed.
Comments of VeriSign, Inc. at 18, Commc'ns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act &
Broadband Access & Servs., ET No. 04-295 (FCC Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter VeriSign
Comments],
available
at
https://67.15.34.213/dmirror/http/www.cdt.org/digi tele/20041108verisign.pdf.
140. See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 137, arts. 20, 21.
141. Id.art. 21, § 3.
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possible reading of CALEA would support, as CALEA specifically deals
42
with non-content data and does not gag service providers. 1
Through the domestic CALEA/IP-enabled services proceeding and the
Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, governments are working
towards control of an unlimited array of Internet services in the name of
preventing crime. The U.N.'s International Telecommunication Union
("ITU") has blandly predicted that such controls are inevitable for the
Internet:
[A]s the Internet transitions to a [Next Generation Network ("NGN")]
infrastructure, on which critical public services are layered, dependent on
differing national policy, legislative and regulatory environments, there
will also [be] a consideration of similar or identical rules applied to
services offered over current circuit-switched networks. Such examples
might include provisions for public safety needs, disability assistance, law
enforcement support (in particular, legal interception), competition

considerations, fraud prevention, prioritization during emergencies,
privacy and data protection, and consumer protection against unwanted
intrusions. These requirements in turn assist in identification
of areas
43
likely to require international standardization activity. 1
The harmonization between the U.N.'s language and that of the FCC in
its IP-enabled services Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is unmistakable.
We are in for a drawn-out global battle between the forces of centralization
and decentralization, between rigidity and openness.
The FCC rulemakings assessed in this Article are important milestones
along our path: They involve incremental technical mandates and preapproval processes affecting the Internet that both reserve in the FCC the
power to do much more and are being echoed around the world. In
particular, the U.N. created a Working Group on Internet Governance
("WGIG") that issued a broad report in June 2005.144
The WGIG
considered "whether there will be international regulation of such things as
spam, fraud and content that's considered inappropriate."' 14 5 The WGIG
adopted an extraordinarily broad Plan of Action, a document more than 20
142. Indeed, the Convention provisions dealing with interception of content data was kept
secret until just before the deadline provided by the Council of Europe for comments. See
generally Yaman Akdeniz, Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties:

the

Non-Governmental

Organizations

An Advocacy Handbook for

(2003),

http://www.cyber-

rights.org/cybercrime/coe handbook crcl.pdf.

143. U.N. Int'l Telecomm. Union, Council Working Group on the World Summit on the
Information Society, Beyond Internet Governance,at 11, U.N. Doc WG-WSIS 7/13-E (Dec.
8, 2004), available at http://www.itu.int/council/wsis/Geneva3 04/intgov-contribution-wg-

wsis.doc. Indeed, in VeriSign's view, "[t]he implementation of real-time traffic data and
content production requirements under the Cybercrime Convention and numerous MLATs
effected for law enforcement, critically depends on global standards solutions for Next
Generation Networks, including IP-Enabled services and VoIP." Verisign Comments, supra
note 139, at 24.
144. Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (June 2005),
http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf.
145. WSIS ParticipantsStruggle to Reach Internet Governance Consensus, Washington
Internet Daily, July 26, 2004, http://www.warren-news.com/internetservices.htm.
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pages long, addressing issues ranging from connectivity for small rural
villages to joint prosecutions of cybercrime, from "appropriate action on
spam" to e-health initiatives.
There is a deep agenda underneath the WGIG efforts: a quest to
"govern" the Internet just like telecommunications lines, by making it
subject to imposed membranes. As Markus Kummer, secretariat of the
WGIG, makes clear, "[t]here are some member states within the U.N. that
would like to think the Internet itself is a communications medium that
should be regulated like the telecom industry."' 146 And there are deep ties
between the U.N.'s ITU, which is staffing the WGIG and would like to take
over some of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Number's
to
("ICANN") functions, 147 and local telecom agencies, which would like 148
have control over new turf involving Internet-specific regulations.
Common cause has been easy to find within these groups. These local
telecom agencies, which are used to dealing with communications media in
a governmental way, may be looking to harmonize "social policy
standards" for content worldwide. 14 9 "Social policies" may themselves
signal the end of decentralized creation of membranes, by prompting the
use of routers to discriminate against particular kinds of content (packets
containing VoIP or unauthorized video), or requiring ISPs not to connect to
networks deemed to be places where unauthorized content is routinely
available, or requiring law enforcement pre-approval for new Internet
services.
Part IV makes clear that the FCC's jurisdictional determinations should
not be deferred to as a matter of law. But the telecommunications, content,
and law enforcement "industries" are not going to give up on constraining
the information flows of the Internet, the applications that run over it, and
the devices that attach to it. Reversals by courts will lead only towards
action on Capitol Hill, and it is there that the battle will be joined.
IV. DOMESTIC LEGAL ANSWERS

If it is true (a) that recent actions of the FCC threaten the openness of the
Internet and the voluntariness of the information flow membranes that can
be created online, and (b) that these actions are being echoed in different
ways around the world, what should be done about this state of affairs?
146. Interview with Markus Kummer, Head Secretariat of the United Nations Working

International
Telecommunication
Union,
Group
on
Internet
Governance,
http://www.circleid.com/posts/interview-with-united-nations-headsecretariat of wgig/
(last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
147. ITU Chiefs Target ICANN Turf, Computer Bus. Rev. Online, Dec. 20, 2004,

http://www.cbronline.com/article-news.asp?guid=7BB966AD-2017-4673-A034AA0083A2E492 (stating that the International Telecommunication Union ("ITU") "has been
working, mostly quietly, to get its hands on ICANN's responsibilities over the domain name
system and IP address allocation for a number of years").
148. ITU's members are telecommunications companies and nations. See International
Telecommunication Union, Overview, http://www.itu.int/GlobalDirectory/index.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2005).
149. See Johnson et al., supra note 59.
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This part examines possible domestic legal responses to the broadcast flag
scheme and the IP-enabled services/CALEA proceedings.
Both the
broadcast flag and IP-enabled services are being based on the FCC's
"ancillary jurisdiction" under Title I of the Communications Act. 150 As this
part will demonstrate, the FCC's arguments in these two rulemakings in
support of its exercise of jurisdiction are weak, and its determinations on
this score should not be deferred to under the Chevron doctrine. Similarly,
the Commission's statutory argument for extension of CALEA to the
Internet is fatally flawed. All of this points towards referral to Congress of
the policies and rules suggested in these rulemakings.
A. The Communications Act and Ancillary Jurisdiction
The FCC has stated that it is basing its actions in the broadcast flag and
IP-enabled services rulemakings on its "ancillary" jurisdiction under Title I
of the Communications Act. This section rebuts this argument.
The general purpose of the Communications Act of 1934 (amended in
1996) is to "make available.., to all the people of the United States, a
rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."' 151 The Act grants
regulatory authority to the FCC over three specific modes of
communication services: (a) interstate common carriers under Title II, (b)
152
spectrum licensees under Title III, and (c) cable operators under Title VI.
Because manufacturers of consumer electronics equipment and providers of
IP-enabled services are neither Title II common carriers, Title III spectrum
licensees, nor Title VI cable operators, the FCC looks back to Title I of the
Act-where it believes its interstitial or general-purpose authority is
found-to support its jurisdiction over these entities.
Title I is quite general. It creates the FCC "[f]or the purpose of
regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio," in order to "make available, so far as possible, to all the people of
the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at
153
reasonable charges."'
Section 2(a) of Title I states that
[t]he provisions of this act shall apply to all interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign
transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or is received
within the United States, and to all persons engaged within the United
1 54
States in such communication or such transmission of energy by radio.

150.
151.
152.
153.

47
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (2000).
§ 151.
§§ 201-276, 301-399(b), 401-416.
§ 151.

154. Id. § 152(a).
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This section is about scope of coverage-it intentionally excludes people in
the Canal Zone, for example-and says nothing about rulemaking
55
authority.
Section 4 of Title I is a lengthy housekeeping section that defines the
membership of the FCC, sets forth rules about reimbursement of travel
expenses, makes policies about the number of assistants each
Commissioner may hire, and sets rates for overtime pay of field
engineers. 156 Deeply buried after all of this text, the Act states in 4(i) that
"[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may
be necessary in the execution of its functions."' 157 This "necessary and
proper" section seems to be wholly focused on internal housekeeping,
allowing the Commission to make rules that permit it to operate
smoothly. 158 Indeed, this crucial section 4(i) arguably allows the
Commission only to implement regulations that are necessary to carry out
its explicit responsibilities under the Communications Act, and conveys no
independent, stand-alone basis for legislative rulemaking authority to the
Commission.159 Most importantly, section 4(i) is not tied to any provisions
for sanctions. Reading 4(i) to do more than permit internal housekeeping
would render the rulemaking provisions found in Titles II, III, and VI
superfluous. 60
155. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority
over Commercial Television Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 403, 404 (1982).
[Ilt is unclear how the Commission may regulate [television] network behavior
even under this expansive provision of the Act [section 2(a)], unless the provision
is construed to give the FCC authority over everyone in the United States who uses
wire or radio electronic communications facilities, such as by talking on the
telephone.
Id.at 405.
156. 47 U.S.C. § 154.
157. Id. § 154(i).
158. See N. Am. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
that § 154(i) authorizes the FCC to adopt rules "to the extent necessary to regulate
effectively those matters already within the boundaries" of the Act); AT&T v. FCC, 487
F.2d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that "Congress, rather than purporting 'to transfer its
legislative power to the unbounded discretion of the regulatory body,' ... intended a specific
statutory basis for the Commission's authority" (quoting FCC v. RCA Commc'ns, Inc., 346
U.S. 86, 90 (1953))).
159. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2002); New
England Power v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 467 F.2d 425, 430-31 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Necessary
and proper" rulemaking provisions "merely augment existing powers conferred on the
agency by Congress, they do not confer independent authority to [regulate]."), aff'd, 415
U.S. 345 (1974).
160. Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts have made this argument persuasively. Thomas
W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 517-19 (2002) (stating that rulemaking grants not
coupled with any provision for sanctions should be understood to authorize only interpretive
and procedural rules.) James Speta agrees with this interpretation. James B. Speta, FCC
Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It & Limiting It, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 15 (2003).
However, Philip Weiser advocates for a broader, "common-law" use of Title I ancillary
authority to reach Internet-related services:
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In the context of both the flag rule and the IP-enabled services
proceeding, the FCC has pointed to the language of section 4(i) as giving it
broad "ancillary" rulemaking jurisdiction to adopt the relevant rule. Indeed,
the FCC asserts that unless Congress has told the Commission it cannot
regulate, it has the power to adopt any rules that "effectuate the goals" of
16 1
the Communications Act.
It is true that Supreme Court decisions of more than thirty years ago
interpreted the Communications Act to grant the Commission the authority
to regulate cable television based on the idea that such regulation was
"reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's statutory authority over
broadcast television. 162 The Commission clearly had the power to issue
legislative rules that regulated the activities of broadcasters. But when the
FCC then asserted legislative rulemaking authority over the operators of
cable systems, it had not been delegated by Congress any power to regulate
these actors. The Supreme Court's decisions to authorize the Commission
to proceed with rules affecting cable operators have been labeled by
Thomas Merrill as "spectacular breaches of principle" and as examples of
an agency using legislative powers outside the area of its delegated
jurisdiction. 163 The Commission is now leaning heavily on these decisions,
and on this secondary type of regulatory rulemaking jurisdiction, which is
not based on any of the explicit rulemaking authorities granted in Titles II,
164
III, or VI.

The 1968 case that made ancillary jurisdiction famous is United States v.
Southwestern Cable.165 The case began when Midwest Television alleged
that Southwestern Cable Company was cablecasting Los Angeles stations
into the San Diego area, which was hurting the local San Diego broadcast
station. The FCC had initially found that cable systems were neither
common carriers nor broadcasters, and so FCC had no primary jurisdiction
over them.
The Commission sought Congressional approval of its
jurisdiction over cable, but to no avail. The Commission then went ahead
with making rules for the cable industry, and ordered Southwestern not to

Rather than mapping and adjusting the scope of current policies onto the Internet,
the development of a new regime pursuant to Title I can ensure that the Internet
will prosper and compete with existing media without being encumbered by legacy
regulations that may not be appropriate.
Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next GenerationRegulatory Strategy, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 41, 61

(2003).
161. Brief for Respondents, supra note 71, at 23, 25; Digital Broad. Content Prot., 18
F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,563 (2003) (FCC report, order, and further notice of proposed
rulemaking).
162. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 657-58 (1972); United States
v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
163. Merrill, supra note 8, at 2169-70.
164.. Congress later changed the Communications Act to provide for FCC regulation of
cable systems. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000).
165. 392 U.S. at 178.
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expand into areas where it had not been cablecasting before February
1966.166
When Southwestern Cable appealed to the Ninth Circuit, that court held
that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to issue such an order. 167 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the question of the Commission's authority to
promulgate rules prohibiting importation of "distant signals" into the San
Diego television market. 168 The Southwestern Cable Court found that the
FCC's assertion of jurisdiction was appropriate, holding that cable
television was an instrument of "'interstate and foreign communication by
wire or radio"' within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Communications
Act of 1934.169 For this reason the Commission was held to have
"regulatory authority" over cable television. 170 However, the Court chose
not "to determine in detail the limits of the Commission's authority to
regulate [cable television]" under section 2(a).17 1 Instead, stressing that
"'the achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes' was at stake, 172 the
Court noted that the rules were "reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation
of television broadcasting."' 173 Thus, even though no express statute had
been passed supporting FCC's power over cable television, the Court
reasoned that because Title III gave the Commission authority to ensure
exclusive broadcasting areas or zones, the general "wire or radio" statute
provided statutory authority to which the cable authority was "reasonably
174
ancillary."'
Following Southwestern Cable, the Court expanded the broad outlines of
"ancillary jursdiction" that had been created in that case. In United States v.
166. The purpose of these rules was to prevent division of audiences and revenues
between cable television and fledgling ultra high frequency ("UHF") and educational
television stations. Competition by cable operators, the Commission feared, would make
these new ventures unprofitable, thereby frustrating the Commission's long-standing and
congressionally approved policy of attempting to provide locally controlled broadcast
television service. See id. at 175 & nn.41-42.
167. Sw. Cable Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 157
(1968).
168. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 159-60.
169. Id. at 167-69 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)).
170. Id. at 173.
171. Id. at 178.
172. Id. at 177 (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780 (1968)).
173. Id. at 178.
174. Id. at 175, 178.
In 1976, in National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit interpreted Southwestern Cable to be based on the
Commission's power to require such zone exclusivity:
The Supreme Court's decision [in Southwestern Cable] to define F.C.C.
jurisdiction over cable operators in terms of its jurisdiction over television
broadcasting emanated from a finding that the two operations would otherwise
conflict rather than from a determination that cable television fit neatly within the
Communications Act provisions governing broadcasters.
533 F.2d 601, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring). In National Association of
Regulatory Commissioners, the D.C. Circuit denied the FCC's authority to preempt state
regulation of two-way non-video communication because the FCC showed insufficient
connection between its rules and the regulation of broadcasting. Id. at 617.
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Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video /), 175 the FCC had promulgated a rule
that cable systems serving more than 3500 subscribers had to provide some
of their own programming. 176 A sharply divided Supreme Court upheld
this rule under the FCC's ancillary authority, reasoning (again) that section
2(a) conferred regulatory power on the Commission. 177 Because section
2(a) did not itself "prescribe any objectives for which the Commission's
regulatory power over [cable television] might properly be exercised," a test
was needed for finding whether such proper objectives existed. 17 8 The
Court found such a "test" in examining whether "long-established
regulatory goals" had been met, and concluded that such an "origination
rule" applied to cable systems would "further the achievement of longestablished regulatory goals in the field of television broadcasting by
increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression and
augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of services .... "179
The Midwest Video I Court concluded that "the regulation preserves and
enhances the integrity of broadcast signals and therefore is 'reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."" 180 Under
this standard, the Commission was held to be authorized to require cable
program origination since such a requirement furthered Commission
policies with respect to both enhancement of local service and
diversification of control of available television and cable programming. 181
Midwest Video I thus took a giant step beyond Southwestern Cable in
relaxing the nature of the "ancillariness" necessary to support an assertion
of Commission power. Midwest Video I arguably turns on a determination
that "ancillary to broadcasting" means not only "for the protection of
broadcasting" (as in Southwestern Cable) but also extends to any regulation
of cable which in its own right serves the purposes pursued by broadcast
82
regulation.1
But the Midwest Video I Court sustained the Commission's jurisdiction
to issue its regulations by only a 5-4 vote and without an opinion for the
Court. Chief Justice Warren Burger cast the deciding vote, and, in a
separate opinion, wrote that "[c]andor requires acknowledgment, for me at
least, that the Commission's position strains the outer limits of even the
open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the
Commission and the courts." 183 Though not "fully persuaded that the
175. United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
176. Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations Relative
to Community Antenna Television Systems, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972) (FCC report and order).
177. Midwest Video 1, 406 U.S. at 661.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 667-68 (quoting Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna Television Sys., 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 202 (1969)
(FCC first report and order)).
180. Id. at 670 (quoting United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1967)).
181. See id. at 668-70.
182. Id. at 662-63.
183. Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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the correct decision in [the] case," he was inclined
Commission ha[d] made184
to defer to its judgment.
In the very next Supreme Court case about FCC ancillary jurisdiction,
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I/),185 the Court confirmed
that the "outer boundary" of jurisdiction had been reached in Southwestern
Cable and Midwest Video I and that the FCC had to be reined in. In
Midwest Video II, the FCC had created rules requiring cable television
systems to make available certain channels for access by public,
educational, local governmental, and leased-access users, and to furnish
equipment and facilities for access purposes. 186 Under these new rules,
cable operators were deprived of all discretion regarding who could exploit
187
their access channels and what could be transmitted over such channels.
Respondents contended that the regulations were not only qualitatively
different from those heretofore approved by the courts, but that they also
contravened freedom of the press guarantees-particularly the command of
the Communications Act of 1934, section 3(h), (contained in the definition
of "common carrier") that "a person engaged in ... broadcasting shall not
188
...be deemed a common carrier."'
The Supreme Court, reversing the FCC, found that the FCC's actions
amounted to regulating cable systems as common carriers, and that
189
authority for such regulation had to come specifically from Congress.
"Though afforded wide latitude in its supervision over communication by
wire, the Commission was not delegated unrestrained authority."' 190 Mere
"reasonable relation" to Commission desires was not sufficient to justify
ancillary jurisdiction. 191
More recently, the FCC argued that its Title I ancillary jurisdiction
192
justified requiring "video descriptions" for television programming,
184. Id. For Chief Justice Burger, the decisive factor was that cable systems are
"dependent totally on broadcast signals." Id. at 675. By "interrupt[ing] the signal and
put[ting] it to their own use for profit, they take on burdens, one of which is regulation by the
Commission." Id.at 676. In both the broadcast flag and IP-enabled services settings, there
can be no argument that some "interruption of signal" event has occurred.
185. 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979) (finding that rules requiring cable operators to provide
equipment, facilities, and channel access to the public were not reasonably ancillary to
FCC's regulation of broadcast and therefore were outside FCC jurisdiction).
186. See id. at 691-94.
187. See id
188. 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2000).
189. Midwest Video 11, 440 U.S. at 708-09.
190. Id. at 706.
191. See id at 708-09.
192. Implementation of Video Description of Video Programming, 15 F.C.C.R. 15,230,
15,256-57 (2000) (FCC report and order adopting rules which mandated a certain amount of
television programming with "video descriptions" per quarter). Video descriptions
provide aural descriptions of a television program's key visual elements (such as
the movement of a person in a scene) that are inserted during pauses in the
program dialogue. Video descriptions change program content because they
require the creation of new script to convey program details, whereas closed
captions present a verbatim transcription of the program's spoken words.
Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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noting that comments it had received demonstrated "the importance of
video description to persons with visual disabilities."' 193 The MPAA
objected and filed suit. 194 In a crisp opinion, the D.C. Circuit reversed the
FCC's determination, noting that Congress had not explicitly "authorize[d]
19 5
the Commission to adopt regulations implementing video descriptions."'
The court rebuked the FCC for its overuse of Title I, saying, "Contrary to
the FCC's arguments suggesting otherwise, § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151, does not
give the FCC unlimited authority to act as it sees fit with respect to all
aspects of television transmissions,
without regard to the scope of the
96
proposed regulations."1
B. Breadth ofFCC's Ancillary JurisdictionClaim
The FCC's key jurisdictional claim in both the broadcast flag and IPenabled services rulemakings is that the Commission has regulatory
authority over all interstate communication by wire or radio and all devices,
facilities, apparatus, or anything else "associated with the overall circuit of
messages sent and received" via wire or radio. 19 7 The FCC also appears to
believe that it has had this power since 1934, and has simply chosen not to
198
exercise it since then.
As outlined above, in the absence of an express statutory delegation, the
FCC does not have legislative rulemaking authority under Title I over all
wire and radio communications within the United States and all devices
concerning these communications. In both the broadcast flag and IPenabled services contexts, Congress has clearly stated that it does not want
the FCC to have the power to make detailed rules about either (1) devices
199
that receive digital files or (2) the Internet generally.
Specifically, in the All Channel Receiver Act ("ACRA"), Congress
granted the FCC constrained authority to ensure that television sets receive
all channels but withheld the broader power over television sets and
2 00
"downstream devices" that the Commission would now like to have.
193. Implementation of Video Description, 15 F.C.C.R. at 15,232.
194. Motion PictureAss'n, 309 F.3d at 796.

195. Id.at 798. The D.C. Circuit also refused to accord Chevron deference to the FCC's
determination of its powers, saying that the Commission had "acted without delegated
authority from Congress" and thus Chevron was inapplicable. Id.at 807.
196. Id.at 798.
197. Brief for Respondents, supra note 71, at 17 (FCC response to the American Library
Association's challenge to its jurisdiction to adopt the broadcast flag rule); see also IPEnabled Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4895 (2004) (FCC notice of proposed rulemaking)

("Title I of the Act confers upon the Commission ancillary jurisdiction over matters that are
not expressly within the scope of a specific statutory mandate but nevertheless necessary to
the Commission's execution of its statutorily prescribed functions.").
198. Brief for Respondents, supra note 71, at 25.
199. See supra Part II.
200. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (2000). Originally, the All Channel Receiver Act ("ACRA")
would have given the FCC broad authority to set performance standards for television
receivers. See S. Rep. No. 87-1526 (1962), as reprintedin 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1873, 1879.
But the draft bill was sharply questioned for the role it allowed the FCC in receiver design.
Id. Congressman Kenneth Roberts stated that "'[t]he FCC should not have the power to
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Other than in the broadcast flag proceeding, the FCC has not in the past
ordered non-common-carrier manufacturers to change the design of their
products in the absence of a statute specifically granting the Commission
authority to make such demands. Instead, the FCC has been careful not to
implicitly require that particular forms of technology be installed. There are
specific statutes authorizing the FCC to make rules about harmful
interference from radiating devices, 20 1 about closed-captioning decoder
20 2 and about the
circuitry (but not about specifications for such circuitry),
20 3
V-Chip).
V-Chip (but not about specifications for the
In January 2004, a coalition of library associations and consumer groups
sued the FCC in the D.C. Circuit, challenging the Commission's
jurisdiction to adopt the broadcast flag rule. 20 4 In May 2005, the D.C.
Circuit agreed that the FCC did not have jurisdiction over the post-receipt20 5
of-signal operation of devices, and struck down the broadcast flag rule.
As for the IP-enabled services proceeding, every one of the "social
policies" proposed by the FCC is something that has been imposed in the
20 6
past on telecommunications services providers--on common carriers.
The Commission lacks any statutory authority to impose these policies on
require that all sets be color sets, or have a certain size of picture tube or be made with a
certain size speaker and so forth."' Elec. Indus. Ass'n. Consumer Elec. Group v. FCC, 636
F.2d 689, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting All-Channel Television Receivers: Hearing on S.
2109 before the Subcomm. on Communications of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong.
59 (1962) (statement of Rep. Kenneth A. Roberts)). Congress decided to "carefully limit[]"
the FCC's authority only to ensure that televisions "adequately receiv[e] all frequencies." Id.
at 692, 696. In August 2002, the FCC issued its Digital Tuner Order using ACRA as
authority, directing that, on a phased-in basis starting in July 2004, all televisions sold in the
United States must contain a digital tuner. Review of the Comm'n's Rules & Policies
Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television, 17 F.C.C.R. 15,978, 15,996 (2002) (holding
that ACRA had expressly devolved to the FCC the power to require that televisions sold in
the U.S. "be capable of adequately receiving all frequencies allocated by the Commission to
In late October 2003, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's
television broadcasting").
jurisdiction to enter the Digital Tuner Order, citing specifically FCC's reliance on ACRA.
Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291 (D.C. Cir. 2003). This case strongly supports
the notion that the FCC requires a statutory mandate in order to require non-common-carrier
manufacturers to modify their devices.
201. 47 U.S.C. § 302.
202. S.Rep. No. 101-393, at 9 (1990), as reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1438, 1446.
203. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(x), 330(c). Again, these provisions of the act were not
technology-specific, and authorized the FCC only to require manufacturers to equip
televisions with "a feature designed to enable viewers to block display of programs carrying
a common rating." H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 196 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin 1996
In doing so, Congress instructed the FCC to preserve for
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 210.
manufacturers the option of using "alternative technology that meets certain standards of
cost, effectiveness and ease of use." Id.
204. Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag,25 Hastings Comm. & Ent.
L.J. 603 (2003).
205. See Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
206. "The Commission has concluded, and courts have agreed, that the
'telecommunications service' definition [found in the Communications Act] was 'intended to
clarify that telecommunications services are common carrier services."' IP-Enabled Servs.,
19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4880-81 (2004) (FCC notice of proposed rulemaking) (quoting Cable &
Wireless, PLC, 12 F.C.C.R. 8516, 8521 (1997) (FCC cable landing license order)).
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non-common carriers. Indeed, Congress, in Section 509 of the same
Communications Act, which the FCC is charged with administering,
explicitly elected not to impose common carrier obligations on interactive
computer services, 20 7 as described in Part I above.
C. Extension of CALLA to the InternetIs a Statutory Impossibility
Perhaps aware that its "ancillary jurisdiction" claims were insufficiently
strong to withstand litigation in the broadcast flag and IP-enabled services
settings, the Commission has not relied on this theory in the CALEA
context. Instead, the FCC has used a novel reading of the CALEA statute
to support its argument that CALEA should be extended to the Internet.
CALEA states that the term "telecommunications carrier" (the entities
covered by CALEA) includes "a person or entity engaged in providing wire
or electronic communication switching or transmission service to the extent
that the Commission finds that such service is a replacement for a
208
substantial portion of the local telephone exchange service ....
CALEA then excludes from the definition of "telecommunications carrier"
all "information services." 20 9 The Commission has interpreted the
"substantial replacement" language of CALEA to cover both provision of
any kind of broadband Internet access service and "interconnected" VoIP
services, 2 10 and has ignored the overarching "information services"
exclusion-effectively reading this exclusion out of the statute.
As discussed above, CALEA was a narrowly drawn statute focused
carefully (after much negotiation) on the traditional telephone system, and
the "information services" exclusion from the scope of CALLA was
intended to be broadly read. The Commission has no authority to redraw
the outlines of CALEA's application to include either2 11Internet access or
Internet applications. Only Congress can take this step.
V. INFORMATION FLOWS AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS

Once we are back in Congress to talk about regulating the Internet in
order to assist law enforcement, the content industry, and incumbent
207. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
208. Id. § 1001(8)(B)(ii).
209. Id. § 1001(8)(C)(i).
210. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,976, 56,798
(Sept. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 22, 24, 64).
211. The Commission's belief in its "unregulation" agenda for IP-enabled services
received substantial support in the Supreme Court's recent opinion in National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. BrandX lnternet Services, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005). The
Court said in dicta that although "information-service providers . . . are not subject to
mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II ... the Commission has jurisdiction to
impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction," and
indicated that policy in this "technical and complex" area should be set by the Commission
(and thus impliedly not by the courts or Congress). Id. at 2696, 2705. The BrandX opinion
can fairly be read to give the Commission complete discretion over what rules should be
mandated with respect to "information services" (including the Internet), even if those rules
are the same as rules applied to common carriers.
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telephone companies, what should we say? It is not enough simply to claim
that "the Internet is different" and that therefore Congress should keep
away.
This part presents the claim that the Internet is a complex system.
Insofar as governments care (as they should) about the benefits of the
information flows made possible online, the complexities of these existing
membranes will defeat large-scale governmental intervention. The best
way to proceed is to facilitate the evolution of complex small-scale
regulatory mechanisms that themselves provide social order.
A. The Internet as Complex Environment
The Internet is itself a complex system, made up of many interacting
agents (including many non-state communities) whose dynamic
engagements produce elaborate permeable membranes regulating
information flow. 2 12 Complex adaptive systems, such as the Internet,
economies, weather, and social organizations, are based on the actions of
autonomous agents that act to maximize their "fitness" (or success as
measured against a particular landscape) over time. These agents also
communicate with their neighbors. This structure produces responses that
are neither predictable nor linear. Interactions among these agents lead to
emergent properties of the system-properties that could not be explained
by traditional analysis-that are not properties of the agents themselves.
And the actions of these agents distort or deform the "fitness landscape"
that provides the system's environment, making it a very rugged landscape
indeed. Two key concepts will help us think about the Internet's particular
complexities: "scale" and "patching."
1. Scale
Complex systems are more or less complex at different scales. Indeed,
every complex system is a tradeoff of complexity at one scale (e.g., lots of
complexity at a fine scale, with actions at that scale characterized by
independence and randomness) in exchange for less complexity at another
scale (e.g., little complexity at a higher scale but greater ability to act
coherently and interdependently). An ancient army was fairly complex at a
large scale-but only because all of its soldiers had little autonomy at a fine
scale. In contrast, an unruly mob is complex at a small scale. Every
member of a mob can do whatever he wants. But collectively, mobs cannot
do anything very complex-they can storm a castle, but cannot organize the
resources inside the castle very effectively.
The environments of complex systems are also complex. For example,
from the perspective of a rabbit, his environment is itself a complex system,
full of autonomous agents (other animals, barriers) and interdependence
(predator-prey relationships, food availability).
Both systems and
212. See generally Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked:

(2002).

The New Science of Networks
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environments are complex systems with tradeoffs in complexity at different
scales.
We know that the collective complexity of a traditional hierarchical
organization-the number of possible states that an organization can 2be13
in-can never exceed the complexity of the individual at the very top.
That person has limited bandwidth; literally, he can only take in and give
out a finite amount of information. The problem is that the environment of
an organization may become more complex than the complexity of the
individual at the top of the organization's hierarchy. When that happens,
when there is a mismatch between the complexity of an organization and
the complexity of the organization's environment, the organization will
(over time) fail. The organization will now be in an environment that is too
complex for it to exist.
Similarly, because centralized control attempts for any moderately
complex environment are likely to be less complex than that environment,
they are likely to fail. Think of the food supply for New York City. What
if someone decided that having seventy sources of mushrooms was
inefficient because some people were unable to have access to all the
varieties of mushrooms they wanted, and others had mushrooms on hand
that they did not need? That same person could institute a centrally planned
system that would take careful account of what everyone needed and what
was available, and would ensure that very large quantities of inexpensive
(but high quality) mushrooms would be made available by a single supplier
to restaurants all over the city. The same person, or bureau, would make
decisions about fish and arugula and soy sauce and everything else the city
needed. All fair prices, all planned to the smallest detail. What would
happen?
We would have shortages and long lines all over the city. This is, indeed,
what happened to the Soviet central planners, whose multiple five-year
plans resulted in economic stagnation. 2 14 The Russian system could not
adapt to the many changes in its environment. Central planning of a
complex system, with its many inputs and interdependencies, will not work,
and will be particularly unsuccessful when the system is operating in an
uncertain environment whose complexity exceeds that of the system.
Just as there needs to be a mapping between the complexity of a system
and the complexity of its environment, complexity at different scales
becomes a crucial consideration for system/environment interactions.
Systems that operate at a large scale will defeat small scale environmental
213. Yaneer Bar-Yam, Multiscale Variety in Complex Systems, Complexity, Mar.-Apr.

2004, at 37.
214. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika 17-19 (1987).
Analyzing the situation, we first discovered a slowing economic growth ...
level close to economic stagnation ....

to a

A country that was once quickly closing

on the world's advanced nations began to lose one position after another... [in]
scientific and technological development, [and in] the production of advanced
technology.
Id. at 19.
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complexity if these two systems are able to meet. Thus, for example, if
there are no other impediments an elephant can flatten a person and a tank
can flatten a forest. But if a large-scale system is confronted with barriers
to its operation, it will be defeated by small-scale complexity. So, for
example, if a tank wanted to move through a forest to get to the next town,
but the tank manager was concerned about the health of the forest and was
reluctant to knock down individual trees, the tank's large-scale motions
would be frustrated by the small-scale complexity of its environment.
The U.S. experience in Iraq is illustrative: The U.S. army was perfectly
good at marching into ("flattening") Baghdad, but the post-intervention
maintenance of order in Iraq-which requires enormously complex
interactions with people whom we have no interest in flattening-has been
beyond the capabilities of the forces that are on the ground there. By
contrast, the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan (which used autonomous
Special Forces troops to deal with the complex situation on the ground) was
relatively successful. Large-scale, simple moves by a particular system will
be defeated by the complexity of that system's environment if the two are
unable to engage, for whatever reason.
When one thinks of the Internet as a complex system/environment in
which government is attempting to operate, the problem becomes clear.
The Internet is like the terrain on which a battle is being played out, and it is
an extraordinarily complex landscape. There are many many possible states
of information flows and membranes online, and more are developing every
day. Otherwise stated, the number of possibilities for the states of
information flows online-the online environment's complexity-is very
high indeed.
But governments, as rulemakers, are usually rigidly
hierarchical. Thus, their organizational ability to make decisions is only as
complex as the bandwidth of the person at the top of the relevant hierarchy.
Again, where the complexity of a system (government) is insufficient to
cope with the complexity of its environment (the Internet), the system will
be unsuccessful.
Let us assume that governments plan to mandate large-scale information
flow membranes for the Internet ("this unlawful bit shall not pass this
technical barrier"). What will happen? There are two answers. First, if
governments act on a very large scale, they can simply defeat the
complexity of information flows online. The online world provides
opportunities for governmental informational control that have never been
available offline. Code is very difficult for an average citizen to disobey. If
all the devices that connect to the Internet are constrained by government
mandate, and all applications are monitored by governmental authorities,
there will be no opportunities for the creation of private membranes that
permit the further explosive evolution of social and cultural life online. The
mandated membrane (the tank) can flatten the membranes that now exist
(the forest). Indeed, China has on a large scale taken on exactly this task,
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by creating a border-membrane through which all Internet communications
2
must flow.

15

The second answer is that although large scale operations can certainly
defeat complexity when the large-scale system is able to operate, the
complexity of the Internet's existing information flow structures (many
elements of which governments will want to retain for their positive
benefits) will ultimately make it impossible for governments to act
successfully in establishing their own membranes-particularly if they have
any concerns at all about downstream effects. The complexities of the
Internet's existing information flow structures produce many positive
benefits for governments. Among many other things, economic growthincluding increased productivity, creation of jobs, and higher wages-is
spurred by Internet connectivity and the creation of membranes across
physical, geographical borders.
The Internet is not (just) a sea of
pornography; it makes it possible for tiny businesses in remote villages to
sell their wares and learn about space travel. There are, in fact, many
positive affordances of the Internet that are created by the availability of
decentralized information-flow management. Flattening the complexity of
the Internet's information-flow membranes may have complex downstream
effects that are impossible to predict and are not ultimately beneficial to
2 16
governments.
In other words, scale can win out over complexity only if they can
encounter each other. Because no government will want to completely
flatten the Internet's non-state membrane structure, efforts to constrain the
information flows of the Internet by centralized means will ultimately be
frustrated by the complexity of information flows online.

215. Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Internet Filtering in China, IEEE Internet

Computing, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 70, availableat http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/.
216. Applying large-scale "fixes" to online information flow membranes is roughly
similar to sending a medication into the complex system that is the human body. Medical
researchers know that drugs work by binding to a protein, and usually by inhibiting the
actions of that protein. Many in the past believed that one could change the human body by
targeting a single protein and causing cells to move from one state-e.g., death-to another
(e.g., proliferation). It turns out, however, that proteins targeted for blocking are themselves
part of a network of communicating proteins. So, for example, Vioxx inhibits a protein
called COX-2, which causes pain. But, downstream, COX-2 supports vasoconstriction and
decreases the risk of heart attacks. So Vioxx is a double-edged sword, and has had to be
withdrawn from the market. Marc Kaufman, Merck Withdraws Arthritis Medication, Wash.
Post,

Oct.

1,

2004,

at

Al,

available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/articles/A63157-2004Sep30.html.
Similarly, large-scale membranes designed to
"inhibit" one kind of information flow online will inevitably have unpredictable, amplified,
and possibly conflicting effects down the road. The recent case Centerfor Democracy &
Technology v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Pa, 2004), in which a Pennsylvania state
statute instructing ISPs to block child pornography sites resulted in the blocking of more
than a million innocent and lawful sites, illustrates the risks of large-scale online information
flow membrane management. See Grant Gross, Court Rules Against State Web-Blocking
Law,
PC
World,
Sept.
10,
2004,
at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid, 117740,00.asp.

10,

available

at
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2. Patching
In an environment full of conflict and nonlinear dynamic change, it is
very difficult for a complex system to "find" the global, overall optimum
for the system as a whole. There are simply too many choices to make and
too much wasted time spent wandering the landscape. Systems attempting
to find compromises that will be best for all their actors will often get stuck
on metaphorically "low" hills. Like a drop of water or a ball, they stop
searching for anything "better" once they stop rolling, because any other
step against their dynamic, unpredictable landscape may lead suddenly to a
destabilizing avalanche. The system, in Stuart Kauffman's words, is
"caught in a web of conflicting constraints" in which "each small part of the
system affects other parts of the whole system, [and] changing [the state of
2 17
a single element] will have effects that ripple throughout the system."
The risk of acting in ways that will be harmful is great.
How could management do better? It turns out that they can do better by
diversifying. As David G. Post and David R. Johnson have explained
(drawing on the work of Stuart Kauffman), 2 18 when systems are divided
into patches and agents' actions are measured and responded to with respect
to their effect on the aggregate fitness of their respective patch (rather than
on the system as a whole), the system as a whole will find its way more
efficiently towards an optimum position. 219 In effect, permitting selfish
patches to act in their own self-interest permits the system to "fail"
temporarily-to move to a lower point on the fitness landscape, which then
allows ascent to a higher peak after further moves. Post and Johnson have
also shown that there is a level of spillover effect, or mapping between the
welfare of a particular patch and its effect on outsiders, which will lead to
more optimal overall results. They called this measure of spillover
''congruence."
Thus, deferring to every individual membrane would not lead to social
order. Deferring to a single authoritative source of membranes would lead
to a frozen, lifeless tundra. Stuart Kauffman, as interpreted by Post and
Johnson, has shown us that having a single source of membranes in this
conflict-ridden online landscape would not lead to the best results. Indeed,
such a single patch would inevitably freeze in its tracks on a foothill in the
fitness environment. For optimal results, complex systems should be
divided into competing, co-evolving (and sometimes selfish) patches. From
the Internet perspective, one can think of these patches as sets of rules (or
membranes) permitting particular information flows.
Congress should restrain itself in the name of evolution by listening to
the same intuitions that gave us the healthy, thriving Internet we have
217. Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of SelfOrganization and Complexity 173 (1995).
218. David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent":
Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 Chi.-

Kent L. Rev. 1055 (1998).
219. Id. at 1059-60.
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today. Congress should recognize the scaling issues that will make
intervention difficult, and permit the "patching" of rules by facilitating the
continued development of private information flow membranes online.
CONCLUSION: THE MESSY GLOBAL LANDSCAPE

Internet governance is, in reality, focused on regulating information
flows and not at all with traditional "governance" of behavior by
governments. These information flows, in turn, are occurring within a
complex environment-the Internet-whose dynamics are nonlinear and
unpredictable. If information flows are the subject of Internet governance,
how should they be governed?
We know that most large top-down engineering projects fail because they
are simply too complex, and that centralized approaches to these projects
will not work. 220 We also know that large-scale, simple approaches to
complex environments will fail if their ability to operate is frustrated;
online, because there are many information-flow membranes that are
valuable to governments, large-scale governance efforts will never
succeed. 22 1
Finally, we know that evolution produces contextual
"solutions" to these hard engineering problems. 22 2 We thus have two
choices: to avoid altogether the complex task of working on information
flows, or to allow "better" membranes to emerge through evolution.
Because governments will not be content with simply leaving information
flows alone, they will need evolutionary guidance to encourage the
development of highly evolved membranes.
The great choice we face at this moment in the history of the Internet is
that there are very powerful forces at work-law enforcement,
telecommunications companies, and the content industry-who would like
to see mandated membranes and gateways of all kinds erected to block
particular bits online. These industries are demanding exactly the kind of
large-scale, tank-flattening-the-forest kinds of initiatives that pose great
risks to the future of online life because they will stifle continued evolution.
We need to point out to legislative bodies that online life is already highly
structured. Patches abound. Non-state groups are arising that are creating
their own membranes for information flows, and there is a real marketplace
220. Yaneer Bar-Yam, When Systems Engineering Fails-Toward Complex Systems
Engineering, http://necsi.org/projects/yaneer/E3-IEEE final.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
A 1995 study by the Standish Group showed that an astounding 30% of large U.S.
engineering projects were scrapped, 50% went nearly 200% over cost, and 20% were
"challenged"-fraught with difficulties. The Standish Group, Chaos (1995), available at
http://wwwbroy.in.tum.de/lehre/vorlesungen/vse/WS2004/1995_StandishChaos.pdf.
221. See supra Part I.
222. Bar-Yam, supra note 220; see Barbara A. Cherry, Office of Strategic Planning and
Policy Analysis, Fed. Commc'ns Comm., The Telecommunications Economy and
Regulation as Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism,
available at http://quello.msu.edu/complexity/CherryTPRC04.pdf (last visited Oct. 23,
2005); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of EnvironmentalLaw, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 933
(1997).
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of ideas online that allows these groups to act as civic organizations. 223
Vast numbers of people are online and are participating in evolving and
value-creating information exchanges of all kinds. (Indeed, one of the
primary engines behind calls for Internet governance is not a quest for
governance at all, but rather the desire of developing nations to be online at
lower costs than are currently permitted by global settlement regimes.) The
online world is no longer the Wild West and may never have been.
It is true that there are forces of informational destabilization that are
perceived to be at work. Spain is often cited as one of these forces; some
people will say that email has become useless because of the seething flood
of unwanted messages being propagated across the Internet. Security
threats generally are viewed as enormous problems online, with viruses and
hacking attacks becoming central concerns of businesses and governments.
Terrorists are using the Internet to plan their attacks (just as they would use
any method of communication available to them), and law enforcement
agencies would like the power to be able to listen in easily and to retain all
possible communications among the bad guys. Fraud is viewed as a
problem that is more prevalent online than offline. Peer-to-peer file trading
is also viewed as destabilizing, particularly to a content industry that has
heretofore been able to control distribution windows for its works.
Each of these incrementally destabilizing phenomena is viewed by some
to be capable of causing an electronic natural disaster-an avalanche of
bits. We know from complexity theory, however, that the risk of an
avalanche is one we have to take in order to obtain the benefits of a
dynamic, communicating, evolving, optimal system. We also know that we
are more likely to get that optimal system if we allow communities and
groups of all kinds to build their own patch membranes. This is, in a sense,
the lesson of federalism, and federalism that includes a role for online nonstate communities is what is needed for the Internet. The harmonized rule
of law, in this bit-based setting, is not as important as respect for the
cultures and societies that are emerging online.
If we allow a diverse set of communities to adopt their own rules and
make their own decisions about their own two-way membranes (allowing
and blocking flows of information), we will facilitate the co-evolution of
patches toward a better overall result. Central planning regarding the
permeability of information membranes-whether replication or
amplification of bits is permitted across a particular boundary--can never
work as well. The only available strategy to create a good society has been
to allow valuable membranes to evolve. These membranes include civic
groups, innovative economic action, constructive social collaboration, and
many other things that make up civic life. Because the nature, intensity,
and content of information flows online will continue to change, and
because the desires of individuals and the nature of the groups they join will
223. Noveck, supra note 24, at 5 ("We should explore ways to structure the law so as to
circumscribe malevolent groups while deferring political and legal decisionmaking to
decentralized group-based decisionmaking.").
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continue to evolve, we need to be friendly to conditions that permit optimal
flexibility and facilitate evolution of permeable information-flow
membranes. We may experience some temporary avalanches along the
way, but the membranes that emerge will evolve to fit the landscape. We
will never be stuck.
Somehow, the perception that the Internet is a machine constructed out of
tangible hardware and binary software code has led to a view that it can be
regulated by a machine. But the real Internet, the one that matters, is as
interesting as society itself. It could no more be governed by a centralized
authority than could a good conversation. In a larger sense, we clearly still
need governments to prohibit (offline) murder. But the targeted regulation
of the bad behavior of bad actors is a kind of activity that is very different
from efforts to control where bits flow. We have never willingly looked to
governments to control information flows, because decentralized actions by
diverse individuals and groups are clearly much better suited to take on this
highly complex task.
Once we understand the importance of membranes and the impossibility
of designing them in advance, the desirability of facilitating evolution as the
key global legal and political goal for Internet governance is clear.
Information flow membranes will get "better" by co-evolving-adapting,
through feedback and continuous change to a world filled with other
complex systems with which they have to interact. Our social institutions,
our collective information flow membranes, must be allowed to evolve to
become as complex as necessary to permit the most valuable and interesting
society to emerge. Given what we know about complex networks, the
course of this evolution will tend towards heterogeneity, not
224
homogeneity.
Congress needs to show leadership at this moment by reasserting its
hands-off, "unfettered by federal or state regulation" approach-which is an
"evolutionary" approach to permeable information flow membranes stated
in legislative language-to the Internet. There is still a chance that if
Congress takes a cosmopolitan 22 5 approach to Internet governance it will be
able to persuade other agencies around the world to restrain their regulatory
desires despite the entreaties of law enforcement, the content industry, and
telecommunications companies. The natural state of the cosmos, and of the
Internet, is not chaos. It is, instead, order, that comes about with no
external pilot. But this kind of lively, dynamic order only emerges when it

224. The Dawkins gene-centered view of the world is wrong. See generally Richard
Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1990). "In fact, spontaneous pattern formation in the presence
of disruptive selection increases the generation and duration of genetic diversity." Erik M.
Rauch
et
al.,
NECI
Research
Projects,
Evolution
and
Ecology,
http://necsi.org/projects/sayama/evolecol.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
225. Paul Schiff Berman has persuasively argued for a "cosmopolitan" view of Internet
jurisdiction, attempting to locate jurisdictional middle ground between strict territorialism on
the one hand and expansive universalism on the other. Paul Schiff Berman, The
Globalization of Jurisdiction,151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311,490-512 (2002).
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is permitted to do so. The next step in Internet governance should be to
take the long view.

Notes & Observations

